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AWAY FROM WAIVER: A RATIONALE FOR THE 
FORFEITURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Peter Westen*t 
Ten years ago, when ~ was a student in law school, I learned 
that it was difficult for a criminal defendant to lose completely his 
right to assert constitutional defenses. The only way he could re-
linquish his constitutional defenses, I was told, was by actually "waiv-
ing" them. Moreover, in order to establish that a defendant had 
waived his defenses, the state faced a rigorous test: it had to show, 
in the famous phrase, that his waiver was "knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary."1 In other words, before the state could permanently pre-
vent a defendant from asserting constitutional defenses, it had to 
show that he made a deliberate decision to forgo these defenses, that 
he made the decision after being fully apprised of the consequences 
and alternatives, and that the state itself had done nothing to make 
a decision to assert his rights more "costly" than a decision to relin-
quish them. 
Today things are different. Law students now learn that a 
defendant can lose his constitutional defenses not only by waiving 
them, but also by "forfeiting" them. The significant difference be-
tween waiver and forfeiture is that a defendant can forfeit his de-
fenses without ever having made a deliberate, informed decision to 
relinquish them, and without ever having been in a position to make 
a cost-free decision to assert them. Unlike waiver, forfeiture occurs 
by operation of law without regard to the defendant's state of mind. 
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Harvard 
University; J.D. 1968, University of California, Berkeley.-Ed. 
t If it were customary to dedicate articles, I would dedicate this piece to my 
colleagues, Jerry Israel, Yale Kamisar, and Terry Sandalow, who first opened my 
eyes to the differences between ''waiver" and "forfeiture." I am also especially grate-
ful to Jerry Israel and Richard Lempert for their thoughtful comments on earlier 
drafts of the article; they have not only enriched my understanding of criminal 
procedure, but, by their generous gifts of time and thought, have helped make this 
a law faculty where collegial scholarship is both a possibility and a joy. 
1. The classic formulation of the waiver doctrine is in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464 (1938): "A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or aban-
donment of a known right or privilege." Everyone's favorite article on waiver, and 
still the most provocative treatmeµt of the subject, is Tigar, The Supreme Court, 
1969 Term, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970). 
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A good example is the loss of constitutional defenses that occurs by 
law when a defendant enters a plea of guilty; another is the loss of 
constitutional defenses that occurs by rule when a defendant fails to 
assert his defenses in a timely fashion before trial. 
To my knowledge, however, no one has yet satisfactorily iden-
tified the constitutional rationale for forfeiture or explained the 
connection between forfeiture and waiver. This lack of understand-
ing immediately raises a host of questions. Why, when we are so 
concerned about the circumstances surrounding the waiver of even 
a single constitutional right, do we casually condone the wholesale 
loss of rights by forfeiture? Is there something unique about the 
nature of a guilty plea that justifies forfeiture in that context, or are 
there similar considerations that would justify it elsewhere? Are all 
rights forfeited by a guilty plea, or are there some constitutional 
rights that, by their very nature, cannot be forfeited? If some rights 
cannot be forfeited by a plea of guilty, can they nonetheless be for-
feited by other procedural devices? Finally, if some constitutional 
defenses cannot be forfeited, can they nonetheless be waived? 
This essay is an informal attempt to explore these questions. I 
begin by trying to identify the rule that distinguishes those constitu-
tional rights that can be forfeited by a plea of guilty from those, if 
any, that cannot be forfeited; from that rule I attempt to derive ~ome 
general principles to explain forfeiture in the context of a guilty plea. 
Next, having formulated a tentative rationale for forfeiture in that 
context, I test the rationale in other contexts by determining what 
rights a defendant who stands trial can (and cannot) forfeit by failing 
to assert them in a timely fashion. Finally, I explore the relationship 
between the concept of forfeiture and the apparently independent 
notion of waiver. 
I. THE FORFEITURE OF DEFENSES BY PLEA OF GUILTY 
The law of forfeiture has developed more fully in regard to guilty 
pleas than in other areas of criminal procedure. It was in connec-
tion with a guilty plea that the modern Supreme Court first held that 
a defendant can permanently forfeit constitutional defenses without 
ever having made a deliberate decision to waive them; yet, it was 
also in~this connection that the Court first held that there are certain 
rights that cannot be constitutionally forfeited. It should be fruit-
ful, therefore, to begin this analysis of forfeiture with an inquiry into 
the rule that distinguishes those rights that can be constitutionally 
forfeited by a plea of guilty from those that cannot. 
1216 Michigan Law Review 
A. Forfeiture by Plea of Guilty: The Rule 
1. The Early Guilty Plea Cases 
[Vol. 75:1214 
During a three-year period beginning in 1970 with the decisions 
in the Brady trilogy,2 the Supreme Court held in a series of cases 
that a defendant who pleads guilty may lose the right thereafter to 
raise constitutional defenses to his conviction, even though he was 
unaware of the defenses at the time he entered his plea. A good 
example of the operation of this principle is found in Tollett v. Hen-
derson.3 The defendant in Tollett, who was black, pleaded guilty 
to first degree murder and was sentenced to ninety-nine years in 
prison. Twenty years later, he petitioned for habeas corpus, arguing 
that his conviction should be set aside because of a constitutional de-
fect in the racial composition of the grand jury that had indicted him. 
He contended that he had not waived the grand jury defense in any 
traditional sense, because neither he nor his lawyer had been aware 
of it at the time he entered his plea. He further argued that, even 
if they had been aware of it, his lawyer, who was white, would not 
have been wholly free to assert the claim of racial discrimination 
without fear of official reprisal. The Supreme Court conceded that 
the indictment to which the defendant had pleaded guilty was consti-
tutionally defective. Nonetheless, it rejected his claim, holding that 
even though the defendant had not waived the defense in the tradi-
tional fashion, he had forfeited it by pleading guilty: 
If the issue were to be cast solely in terms of "waiver," the Court 
of Appeals was undoubtedly correct in concluding that there had been 
no such waiver here. But just as the guilty pleas in the Brady 
trilogy were found to foreclose direct inquiry into the merits of the 
claimed antecedent constitutional violations there, we conclude that 
respondent's guilty plea here alike forecloses independent inquiry into 
the claim of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury.4 
2. The "Brady trilogy" refers to three companion cases in which the Supreme 
Court for the first time gave constitutional approval to the practice of plea bargaining 
and to the notion of forfeiture. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); 
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790 (1970). For a scholarly description and criticism of the Brady trilogy, see Al-
schuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 41 U. CoLO. 
L. REV. 1 (1975). Professor Alschuler assumes that these decisions must be under-
stood in the traditional terms of waiver; accordingly, since the cases cannot be ex-
plained in such terms, he concludes that the decisions are fundamentally unsound. 
Although I obviously disagree with both his assumption and his conclusion, Professor 
Alschuler's views deserve thoughtful consideration by everyone interested in these 
questions. 
3. 411 U.S. 258 (1973). 
4. 411 U.S. at 266. It is significant that Justice White (who authored the trilogy 
opinions for the Court) has also stated that the Brady trilogy did not rest on notions 
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Two significant conclusions emerge from these guilty plea cases. 
First, although the Court was never very explicit on this point, it did 
not seem to hold that the entry of a guilty plea requires the for-
feiture of constitutional defenses, or that the Constitution-itself pro-
hibits the state or federal courts from providing for the survival of 
such defenses as a matter of domestic law. Rather, the Court appar-
ently took the more limited position that, if a state or federal courf 
determines as a matter of domestic law that a plea of guilty is final 
and that a defendant who enters such a plea in its courts thereby 
forfeits his defenses, then the Constitution does not disallow the for-
feiture-even with respect to defenses that are constitutional in 
origin. Thus, the state and federal courts are apparently free to de-
cide that a plea of guilty in their courts shall not operate as a for-
feiture of defenses: that is wholly a matter of domestic law on whch 
the Constitution itself has nothing to say, one way or another. Hence 
the effect of a guilty plea depends first upon whether (and to what 
extent) the domestic law provides for a forfeiture of defenses follow-
ing such a plea; only then can one determine whether the domestic 
law of forfeiture is constitutional. 5 
of "waiver": 
[T)he [majority] contentions assume that the Brady trilogy was based upon no-
tions of waiver. In other words, it assumes that this Court has in the past 
refused to set aside "guilty pleas" on the basis of antecedent violations of con-
stitutional rights only because the plea was deemed to have "waived" those 
rights. This assumption finds some support in the language of those cases, but 
waiver was not their basic ingredient. 
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 299 (1975) (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). If, as I believe, the Court is correct in stating that its guilty plea cases 
can be explained on grounds other than waiver, then it is almost irrelevant that 
the decisions cannot also be squared with traditional notions of waiver. Some com-
mentators, however, criticize the Brady trilogy for failing to satisfy traditional no-
tions of waiver. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 41; Tigar, supra note 1, at 4 
("Taken together, they [the Brady trilogy] lead me ... to conclude that the earlier 
search for reasoned and consistent principles of waiver is now put to full flight 
... "); and Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present but Unknowable" Con-
stitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 1435 
(1974) ("The Brady trilogy's rule of waiver strains, perhaps irreconcilably, tradi-
tional concepts of waiver ... "). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
782, 785 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
5. This view finds support in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). The 
defendant in Lefkowitz pleaded guilty in a jurisdiction that provided as a matter 
of state law that a defendant may plead guilty without forfeiting the right to appeal 
his conviction on the ground that evidence to be used against him had been seized 
in violation of the fourth amendment. After exhausting his state appeals, the defend-
ant petitioned for federal habeas corpus, contending that his conviction should be 
set aside on fourth amendment grounds; the state argued in response that, for pur-
poses of federal habeas, the defendant had waived his fourth amendment claim by 
pleading guilty. The Supreme Court ruled for the defendant, holding that, even in 
the context of federal habeas corpus, it was state law that defined the preclusive 
effect of the guilty plea on the defendant's constitutional defenses. Lefkowitz is 
significant for our purposes because, obviously, if state law was controlling for pur-
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The second conclusion to be drawn from these cases is that the 
Court, by the end of 1973, was apparently prepared to hold that a 
plea of guilty could constitutionally operate as a forfeiture of all de-
fenses to conviction except those relating to the procedures and cir-
cumstances under which the plea itself was entered. Thus, a guilty 
plea could operate as a forfeiture not only of defenses that would 
have become moot had the defendant gone to trial ( defenses con-
cerning the composition of the indicting grand jury, for example), 
but also of defenses concerning the procedures and evidence by 
which he would have been tried on a plea of "not guilty."° Forfei-
ture could occur without regard to whether the defendant had bene-
fited from the defense in the course of plea bargaining. 7 It could 
occur regardless of whether the defendant knew, or should have 
known, or could ever reasonably have known about his defenses, 8 
and regardless of whether the constitutional defect "caused" him to 
plead guilty.9 
In short, except for constitutional defects in the very proceeding 
at which the guilty plea is entered and defects in the advice of coun-
poses of federal habeas, it must also have been controlling for constitutional purposes; 
otherwise, there would have been no federal claim left for the federal court to review 
by writ of habeas corpus. Indeed, the state in Lefkowitz agreed that, as a co11stit11-
tional matter, it was state law that defined the preclusive effect of the guilty plea 
for purposes of direct review by the Supreme Court; the state merely disagreed with 
the defendant on whether, as a statutory matter, the state law should also be deemed 
controlling for purposes of federal habeas corpus. See 420 U.S. at 290 n.6. But 
cf. 420 U.S. at 294-302 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that federal law controlled 
the case and provided the defendant with no right to overturn his guilty plea). 
6. Compare Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (grand-jury defense), 
with McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (a coerced-confession defense). 
Professor Alschuler believes the Court should have adopted this distinction between 
defenses that are or are not mooted by conviction at trial to distinguish Tollett from 
McMamz. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 29. 
1. Compare McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (where there may 
have been plea bargaining over the alleged defense), with Tollett v. Henderson, 411 
U.S. 258 (1973) (where there was no such bargaining). Justice Marshall unsuccess-
fully urged the Court to distinguish Tollett from McMam1 on this basis. See 411 
U.S. at 270-71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
8. Compare Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970) (where the defendant 
or his lawyer should have been aware of the fifth amendment defense), with Brady 
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (where neither the defendant nor his lawyer 
could have anticipated the then nonexistent defense that the death penalty imposed 
by the statute was unconstitutional). Professor Alschuler believes the Court should 
have adopted this distinction. Alschuler, supra note 2, at 40-41. Cf. Davis v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 233, 254-55 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing 
against forfeiture of defenses absent deliberate and informed waiver). 
9. Compare Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (where the lower court 
found that the defect had no effect on the defendant's decision to plead guilty), 
with McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (where the Court assumed that 
the defendant would not have pleaded guilty except for the defect). Justice Brennan 
has unsuccessfully urged the Court to adopt this distinction. See Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 799-816 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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sel with respect to defendants represented by counsel,10 the Court 
seemed to suggest that a guilty plea could operate as a forfeiture 
of all constitutional defenses to conviction. Not surprisingly, one 
commentator was led to conclude that "[a]ll the bulwarks of the for-
tresses of defenses are abandoned by the plea of guilty."11 This was 
also the position of Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger: "[I]f volun-
tarily and understandingly made, even a layman should expect a plea 
of guilty to be treated as an honest confession of guilt and a waiver 
of all defenses known and unknown. And such is the law."12 Or, 
as another court stated, "[a] guilty plea is normally understood as 
a lid on the box, whatever is in it .... "13 
2. The Meaning of Blackledge v. Perry 
Despite the implications of these earlier cases, in Blackledge v. 
PerryH the Court explicitly held that certain defenses cannot be con-
stitutionally forfeited by a plea of guilty. The defendant in Perry, 
having been convicted and sentenced to six months in prison by an 
inferior court in North Carolina for the misdemeanor of armed 
assault, took a de novo appeal as of right to a court of general juris-
diction. Before Perry could proceed with appeal, however, the 
10. The Court will review guilty pleas to insure that the constitutional formalities 
have been observed at the arraignment itself. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 
238 (1969). The loss of antecedent defenses is ignored, however, except for the 
few that the arraigning judge is required to enumerate to the defendant; and even 
with respect to those, the notice the defendant must receive is very general. Cf. 
Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 926 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting to a denial ot 
certiorari in a case claiming lack of notice). 
The Court will also review guilty pleas by defendants represented by counsel, 
at least where counsel is appointed rather than retained, to insure that the defendant 
received competent legal assistance. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 
(1970). In assessing such competence, however, the court is not concerned with 
whether the lawyer recognized or apprised his client of his constitutional defenses, 
but only with whether the lawyer's advice with respect to the plea was within the 
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases: "The focus of federal 
habeas inquiry is the nature of the advice . . . not the existence as such of an ante-
cedent constitutional infirmity." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973). 
"Thus, while claims of prior constitutional deprivation may play a part in evaluating 
the advice rendered by counsel, they are not themselves independent grounds for 
federal collateral relief". 411 U.S. at 267. 
11. Bishop, Waivers and Pleas of Guilty, 60 F.R.D. 513, 525 (1974) (emphasis 
added). See id. at 520: "The 'sudden death' finality of a valid guilty plea is that 
it waives all constitutional rights and all defenses" (citations omitted, emphasis origi-
nal). 
12. Edwards v. United States, 256 F.2d 707, 709 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 
U.S. 847 (1958). 
13. United States v. Bluso, 519 F.2d 473,474 (4th Cir. 1975). 
14. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). I hope to show in the course of this article that there 
is a principled explanation for the decision in Blackledge. See text at notes 29 
& 44-49 infra. But see Note, supra note 4, at 1454-58. 
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prosecutor filed a superseding charge against him in the higher court, 
charging Perry with a felony offense based on the same conduct for 
which Perry had already been tried and convicted. Instead of pro-
ceeding to trial, Perry pleaded guilty to the felony and was sentenced 
to five to seven years in prison. Several months later, Perry peti-
tioned for relief from his conviction arguing that the prosecutor had 
deprived him of due process by charging him with a felony in re-
sponse to his de nova appeal of the misdemeanor conviction. The 
state responded that even if there were merit to the due process 
claim, Perry had forfeited it by pleading guilty. 
The Supreme Court agreed with Perry that the prosecutor had 
violated due process in responding to Perry's de nova appeal by 
charging him with a greater offense. More important, the Court 
also agreed with Perry that he was free to raise the due process claim 
as a defense to his conviction despite his plea of guilty. The Court 
distinguished its prior decision in Tollett on the ground that the con-
stitutional claim there was one that could have been "cured," while 
the claim in Blackledge "went to the very power of the State to bring 
the defendant into court": 
While petitioners' reliance upon the Tollett opinion is understand-
able, there is a fundamental distinction between this case and that 
one. Although the underlying claims presented in Tollett ... were 
of constitutional dimensions, none went to the very power of the State 
to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against 
him. . . . [E]ven a tainted indictment of the sort alleged in Tollett 
could have been "cured" through a new indictment by a properly se-
lected grand jury. In the case at hand, by contrast, the nature of 
the underlying constitutional infirmity is markedly different. . . . 
Unlike the defendant in Tollett, Perry is not complaining of "antece-
dent constitutional violations" or of a "deprivation of constitutional 
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Rather, 
the right that he asserts and that we today accept is the right not to 
be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation 
of the proceedings against him in the Superior Court thus operated 
to deny him due process of law.15 
What then is the rule in Blackledge for distinguishing forfeitable 
defenses from nonforfeitable defenses? There appear to be several 
possibilities. Thus, perhaps it is the rule that a defendant who has 
been convicted on a plea of guilty may later challenge his conviction 
on any constitutional ground that, if asserted before trial and left un-
corrected, would have left the state with "no power" to obtain a valid 
conviction against him at trial. But, as Justice Rehnquist demon-
strated in his dissent in Blackledge, if this were the rule, even the 
15. 417 U.S. at 30-31 (citation omitted). 
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defense in Tollett would have survived forfeiture: the defendant 
there claimed that the indictment on which he was arraigned was 
constitutionally defective; if his claim had been raised before trial 
and left uncorrected, the state could never have obtained a valid con-
viction against him at trial. Indeed, in that sense, every constitu-
tional defense should survive forfeiture because every defense that 
is asserted in a timely fashion and left uncorrected denies the state 
the "power" to convict. 10 
Another possible formulation of the Blackledge rule is that a 
defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may challenge 
his conviction on any constitutional ground that would preclude the 
state from obtaining a valid conviction without regard to whether the 
defendant asserts it as a defense. The trouble with this formulation 
of the rule in Blackledge is that it goes too far, for one can scarcely 
think of a constitutional claim that precludes the state from obtaining 
a valid conviction without regard to whether the defendant himself 
asserts it as a defense. 17 To be sure, as a matter of domestic 
law, a state may choose to provide that certain defenses (such 
as those relating to subject-matter jurisdiction) are cognizable by a 
court on its own motion, without regard to whether a defendant 
chooses to assert them, on the ground that the state has an interest in 
having them raised. In a sense, it may be said that defenses of this 
kind leave the state with no "power" to obtain a valid conviction. But 
that cannot be said of the constitutional defense asserted in Blackledge, 
or any other constitutional defense for that matter, for the defenses the 
Constitution creates are "personal" to the defendant and, as such, can 
16. If the Court is correct in stating the consequences of upholding respond-
ent's constitutional claim here, and indeed the State lacked the very power to 
bring him to trial, I believe this case is governed by cases culminating in Tollett 
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In that case the State no doubt lacked 
"power" to bring Henderson to trial without a valid grand jury indictment; yet 
that constitutional disability was held by us to be merged in the guilty plea. 
417 U.S. at 35 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
17. I, for one, cannot readily think of a personal constitutional right that is in-
capable of being waived by a competent defendant under at least some circumstances. 
To be sure, there are some rights, such as the defendant's right to trial by jury, 
that the defendant is not free to waive in federal cases, because they are rights that 
the prosecution may assert over his objection. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 
24 (1965). But there is nothing in the Constitution that makes such rights non-
waivable. Rather, to the extent rights are derived from the Constitution, such as 
the right to trial by jury, a defendant is always free to waive them. See Patton 
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). Thus, insofar as there is a rule that prevents 
a defendant from waiving his right to trial by jury without the prosecutor's consent, 
it is a rule derived not from the Constitution, but from domestic federal law and 
is designed to protect the public rather than the defendant. See Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. at 36. Moreover, insofar as there is any further rule that prevents 
a defendant from waiving his right to trial by jury even with the prosecution's con-
sent, it, too, derives its authority from the domestic law. Cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 
7 (the defendant may waive his right to be indicted by grand jury in most cases, 
but not in cases punishable by death). 
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be asserted only by him or by others on his behalf.18 Thus, any rule 
that precludes a defendant from surrendering such defenses, or that 
directs a court to notice them on its own motion over the defend-
ant's objection, has its source not in the Constitution, but in some 
principle of domestic law. Accordingly, if the rule were that a de-
fendant forfeits all defenses except those that a court may notice on 
its own motion, the rule would preclude a defendant from asserting 
any defense that is derived solely from the Constitution, including 
the due process defense in Blackledge.19 
A third possible formulation of the Blackledge rule was recently 
advanced in Menna v. New York,20 in which the Court suggested 
that a defendant convicted on a plea of guilty may challenge his con-
viction on any constitutional ground that would prevent the state from 
obtaining a valid conviction even where the defendant is conceded 
to be / actually guilty of the offense. The defendant in Menna, hav-
ing once been held in contempt for refusing to testify before a grand 
jury on several occasions, was thereafter indicted for refusing to 
testify before the grand jury on one particular occasion. Instead of 
contesting the charge, the defendant pleaded guilty but then ap-
pealed on the ground that he had been twice held in jeopardy for 
the same act of contempt. Without reaching the issue of double 
jeopardy, the highest state court affirmed the conviction on the 
ground that the defendant had "waived" his claim by pleading guilty. 
The Supreme Court, in turn, summarily reversed the conviction with 
a three-page per curiam opinion which held that under Blackledge 
a defendant has a constitutional right to challenge a guilty plea on 
double jeopardy grounds because the defense is one that would have 
18. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-21, 834 (1975). Indeed, to 
say that a right is "personal" to the defendant may be the same thing as saying 
that it is designed to protect only his interests, and that he alone can assert it. Of 
course, that is very different from saying that he has a constitutional right to waive 
it: the fact that a defendant is constitutionally capable of waiving a right under 
certain circumstances does not mean that he has a constitutional right to waive it. 
Even in Farella the Court did not hold that the right-to-counsel clause itself gives 
the defendant a constitutional right to waive counsel; rather, the Court held that 
he had a right to waive counsel only because the sixth amendment contained an 
independent and implicit right-wholly apart from the right to counsel-giving the 
defendant the right to represent himself. 
19. In Blackledge the Court discussed the due-process defense as if it were closely 
analogous to the defense of double jeopardy. 417 U.S. at 31. But, as Justice Rehn-
quist pointed out, the defense of double jeopardy can be waived. 417 U.S. at 35 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, in Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), 
after apparently conceding that the defense of double jeopardy is waivable, the Court 
held that double jeopardy is not forfeited by a plea of guilty. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2. 
Thus, this suggested distinction between "waivable" and "nonwaivable" defenses can-
not be the principle that explains the rule in Blackledge. 
20. 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per curiam). 
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precluded the state from ever obtaining a valid conviction against 
him. In a footnote, however, the Court went on to say that the guilty 
plea cases stand for the proposition that a guilty plea is a conclusive 
admission of factual guilt and, as such, can operate as a forfeiture 
only of those defenses that relate to establishing factual guilt: 
The point of [the guilty plea] cases is that a counseled plea of guilty 
is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and 
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the 
case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's 
imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders 
irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent 
[sic] with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not 
stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established. 
Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner 
no matter how validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, 
therefore, does not bar the claim. 21 
There are several problems with the Menna footnote. The most 
serious objection, which I shall discuss in greater detail later, 22 is that 
there is no constitutional justification for such a rule. The more im-
mediate problem, however, is that the Menna footnote is inconsistent 
with the Court's own cases. In Tollett, for example, the defendant 
was asserting a claim that was independent of his factual guilt: the 
right of the accused to be charged by a process that is free from racial 
discrimination is a right that exists without regard to whether the de-
fendant himself is guilty; even if he is guilty, he can challenge his 
conviction on the ground that other defendants who are similarly situ-
ated except for their racial background are not being prosecuted. 
Thus, by the standard of Menna, the defendant in Tollett should 
have been permitted to assert his defense of equal protection; yet the 
Court there held that he had forfeited the defense by pleading 
guilty.2s 
21. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2 (emphasis original). Surely the Court meant "consistent" 
rather than "inconsistent" After all, the basic theme of the footnote is that a plea 
of guilty operates as a conclusive admission of factual guilt and, as such, renders 
moot or "irrelevant" all constitutional violations that would otherwise tend to cast 
doubt on the defendant's factual guilt, i.e., all constitutional violations that would 
otherwise conflict with the valid establishment of factual guilt. Accordingly, one 
could say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant all constitutional violations that are 
"not logically consistent" with the valid establishment of factual guilt; or, alterna-
tively, one could say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant all constitutional violations 
that are "logically inconsistent" with factual guilt; but it is a simple non sequitur 
to say that a guilty plea renders irrelevant those violations that are "not logically 
inconsistent" with factual guilt. Consequently, one must assume that the Court stum-
bled over its use of multiple negatives and actually meant the opposite of what it 
said. 
22. See notes 37-44 infra and accompanying text. 
23. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (despite the fact that 
a Chinese defendant is conceded to be factually guilty of operating a laundry in 
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Conversely, the defendant in Menna was asserting a defense that 
was related to the determination of factual guilt, for the defense of 
double jeopardy is designed in part to protect innocent defend-
ants from being wrongly convicted by means of successive prosecu-
tions for the same offense. 24 Hence, by the rationale of the Menna 
footnote, the defendant there should not have been permitted to as-
sert the defense of double jeopardy; yet the Court held that he had 
a right to assert the defense despite his plea of guilty. By the same 
token, the speedy-trial defense is also related to the determination 
of factual guilt, because it is designed in part to protect innocent de-
fendants from being wrongly convicted due to the difficulty of pre-
paring a defense long after a crime has occurred. 26 Hence, by the 
rationale of Menna, a defendant should be able to forfeit that de-
fense; yet the right to a speedy trial, like that based on the prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy, is one of those defenses that is deemed 
to survive a guilty plea. 26 
a wooden building without a permit, he may challenge his conviction on the ground 
that non-Chinese launderers similarly situated are not being similarly prosecuted). 
This principle of discriminatory prosecution, which operates without reference to fac-
tual guilt, should also apply to facially discriminatory indictments. See generally 
Alschuler, supra note 2, at 29-30. By the same token, according to Menna, a defend• 
ant who is factually guilty should be permitted to challenge his conviction on the 
ground that evidence to be used against him had been illegally seized in violation 
of the fourth amendment, because the exclusionary rule operates without reference 
to factual guilt; and yet the Court has held that the fourth amendment is not a 
defense that necessarily survives a guilty plea. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 
283, 288-89 (1975) (dictum). See also 420 U.S. at 296 n.3 (White, J., dissenting). 
24. The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and 
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual 
for an alleged offense, thereby . . • enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (emphasis added). 
To be sure, the defendant in Menna was retried following a conviction rather 
than following an acquittal. But with respect to the protection of innocent defend• 
ants, the double jeopardy analysis is much the same in each case. The prohibition 
on retrial following conviction is designed to protect defendants against double pun-
ishment. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717-19 (1969). The prohibi-
tion provides that, having once been convicted and properly sentenced for a crime, 
a defendant cannot be subjected to additional or further punishment against his will; 
it assumes that the defendant's criminal responsibility has been fully accounted for 
in the first proceeding and that he is, therefore, immune from any further claim 
of responsibility by the state. Thus, just as the ban on retrial following acquittal 
is designed to protect defendants who may be innocent, so, too, the ban on retrial 
following conviction is designed to prptect defendants who-with respect to further 
trial and punishment-are presumed to be innocent. 
25. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972). 
26. Cf. United States v. DeCosta, 435 F.2d 630, 632 (1st Cir. 1970) (dictum); 
New York ex rel. Gwynn v. Fay, 215 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 981 (1965). But see United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 386 (1976). 
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Menna is also difficult to square with Blackledge, which distin-
guishes between nonforfeitable defenses that leave the state with no 
"power" to obtain a conviction and thus cannot be "cured," and for-
feitable defenses that do leave the state with the power to obtain 
a conviction and thus can be cured. In contrast, Menna distin-
guishes between defenses relating to "factual guilt," which are said 
to be forfeitable, and defenses not relating to factual guilt, which are 
said to be nonforfeitable. If these two sets of distinctions were in 
fact congruent, one would expect that all defenses relating to factual 
guilt would be curable, and all defenses not relating to factual guilt 
would be incurable. But that is not the case. There are some de-
fenses (such as denial of a speedy trial) that relate to "factual guilt" 
and yet-as we shall see--cannot be "cured"; by the same token, 
there are defenses (such as discriminatory prosecution) that do not 
relate to factual guilt and yet can be "cured."27 
In short, the footnote in Menna presents a paradox: if it is an 
attempt to explain the rule in Blackledge, it is unsuccessful, for it 
creates more confusion than clarity. On the other hand, if it is really 
an effort to overrule Blackledge and substitute a different rule, the 
footnote not only contradicts the text of the Court's opinion ( which 
reaffirms Blackledge), but, as we shall see, would create a constitu-
tional rule that defies explanation. This paradox can only be re-
solved by assuming that, in disposing of Menna summarily, the 
Court did not give the footnote the attention it deserved and that, 
on further reflection, the Court will reject or ignore it. 28 
27. See notes 23 & 26 supra; note 39 infra; text at notes 77-78 infra. 
28. Perhaps the footnote in Menna can be redeemed if it is understood to be 
merely an awkward attempt to restate the rule in Blackledge. See note 49 infra. 
On the other hand, if the Court does eventually repudiate the Menna footnote 
(or explain it away), it will not be the first time the Court has been embarrassed by a 
casual footnote concerning forfeiture. In Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975), for 
example, dissenting Justices Powell and Stewart expressed the view that defendants 
who plead guilty to a crime have no right under Blackledge to challenge their convic-
tions on the ground that the statute defining the crime is unconstitutional: 
Nor is this case like Blackledge v. Perry. In that case the Court stated that the 
due process right at issue . . . was "the right not to be haled into court at all 
. . . ," so that "[t]he very initiation of the proceedings . . . operated to deny 
[petitioner] due process of law." . . . In this case, however, petitioners' claim 
is that the ordinance under which they had been charged is unconstitutional. The 
alleged constitutional infirmity thus lies not in the "initiation of the proceedings" 
but in the eventual imposition of punishment that, assertedly, the State cannot 
constitutionally exact. 
421 U.S. at 441-42 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The question 
of forfeiture, however, had not even been raised by the parties in Ellis. Even if 
the question had been properly presented, the dissenting footnote resolved it in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the universal interpretation of Blackledge by the 
lower federal courts, and with the controlling distinction in Blackledge between "cur-
able" and "incurable" errors. See text at notes 44-49 infra. More important, the 
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Thus far none of the three rules we have formulated is successful 
in explaining the difference between forfeitable and nonforfeitable 
rights. But one possibility remains: a defendant who has been con-
victed on a plea of guilty may challenge his conviction on any con-
stitutional ground that, if asserted before trial, would forever pre-
clude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him, regard-
less of how much the state might endeavor to correct the defect. In 
other words, a plea of guilty may operate as a forfeiture of all de-
fenses except those that, once raised, cannot be "cured." 
This formulation of the rule is consistent with both Tollett and 
Blackledge. Although the grand jury defect in Tollett was the kind 
of error that would ordinarily preclude the state from obtaining a 
valid conviction so long as the error remained uncorrected, it none-
theless could be "cured": the state could have cured the error by 
reconstituting the grand jury and obtaining a proper indictment; if 
it had done so, nothing would have barred a valid conviction. Like-
wise, the constitutional defects at issue in the Brady trilogy could 
have been cured.29 In Blackledge, on the other hand, the due proc-
ess claim-like the claim of double jeopardy in Menna-was based on 
an error that could not be cured; no matter how the state might try to 
reconstitute its evidence or reinitiate the charges, it had no "power" 
to try the defendant for the felony over his objection. The consti-
tutional defense, once asserted, would stand as an impassable and 
insurmountable hurdle between the state and its objective of obtain-
ing a valid conviction. In a word, it was a "complete" defense. 
B. Forfeiture by Plea of Guilty: The Rationale 
Now that we have identified the distinction between forfeitable 
Ellis footnote is flatly inconsistent with Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 
n.2 (1968), in which the Court held that a constitutional claim going to the validity 
of the underlying offense itself does survive a guilty plea. Finally, there does not 
appear to be any justification for the distinction the dissenters would draw between 
errors relating to the "initiation" of proceedings and errors relating to "punishment." 
Hence one must conclude that the dissenting footnote in Ellis, like the footnote in 
Menna, is simply misconceived and will eventually be repudiated. See Alschuler, 
supra note 2, at 17-21. 
29. The defect in Brady could have been cured by redrafting the statute to permit 
both the judge and the jury to impose the death penalty, or by construing the statute 
to prohibit both the judge and the jury from imposing the death penalty. The defect 
in McMann could have been cured by requiring the trial judge to review the validity 
of the confession before allowing it to be considered by the trial jury. The first 
defect in Parker was identical to the defect in Brady; the second defect, relating 
to the admissibility of the defendant's confession, could have been cured by excluding 
the confession from trial. (A defense based on the third defect, that members of 
the defendant's race were systematically excluded from the grand jury, was found 
not to be properly before the Court). Thus none of the defects in the Brady trilogy 
necessarily precluded the prosecution from ever obtaining a valid conviction at trial. 
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and nonforfeitable rights, we can try to discern a rationale for the 
distinction. For although we now know how the rule in Blackledge 
works, we have to understand why: why does a guilty plea operate 
as a forfeiture of all constitutional rights except those that are incap-
able of being cured? Are incurable errors somehow more funda-
mental than curable errors or in some way more important to the 
defendant? If so, is the difference sufficient to support a constitu-
tional distinction between forfeiture and nonforfeiture? 
To begin, perhaps the rule is designed to identify those cases 
in which the constitutional defense can be truly said to have had a 
material effect on the defendant's decision to plead guilty. After 
all, so the argument goes, we do not want to upset convictions when-
ever a defendant can point to some antecedent constitutional error, 
because defendants often plead guilty for reasons that are unrelated 
to constitutional defects in the state's case against them.30 Accord-
ingly, once the state has obtained a conviction through a plea of 
guilty, we should not reopen the matter and require the state to as-
sume the difficult burden of proving its case at trial, unless we can 
be certain that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty had he 
known about the error. Thus, because of the difficulty of determin-
ing a defendant's state of mind and because of the state's interest 
in finality, we may be justified in assuming that only the most seri-
ous errors, i.e., errors supporting "complete defenses," would have 
a material effect on his decision to plead guilty. 
In other words, the Blackledge rule might be designed to 
separate cases in which the constitutional defect can always be pre-
sumed to be material from cases in which the defect may not have 
had any effect on the defendant's decision to plead guilty. Defend-
ants who are aware of "curable" defects in the state's case against 
them may often decide to plead guilty anyway because of a realization 
that the defects can be remedied. But no defendant who is aware 
of an "incurable" error in the state's case against him (and who 
wishes to resist prosecution) would ever choose to plead guilty any-
way, because he would realize that in choosing to stand trial he could 
never be legally convicted. 
30. A defendant who has a basis for claiming that his confession was coerced 
may nevertheless elect to forego that claim and to plead guilty-whether because 
of "his own knowledge of his guilt and a desire to take his medicine"; because 
"he also knows that other admissible evidence will establish his guilt over-
whelmingly"; because he prefers to plead guilty to a lesser charge rather than 
run the risk of conviction on a more serious charge; or because for some other 
reason he determines that it is in his best interest to plead guilty. 
United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1969), va-
cated, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (citations omitted). 
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This rationale is unsatisfactory, however, because it logically ex-
tends beyond cases of incurable errors to cases of curable errors as 
well. Let us assume, for example, that a defendant pleads guilty 
without realizing that the major item of evidence against him is con-
stitutionally inadmissible, and that neither the item nor its fruits may 
be used against him at trial; assume further, that the prosecution 
would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to establish a case 
against him from independent sources. Surely this defendant could 
persuade a court that he would not have pleaded guilty had he 
known about the defect at the time of his plea. Yet it seems unlikely 
that the Supreme Court would permit such a defendant to challenge 
a guilty plea on that ground. Indeed, in a series of cases involving 
curable defects, the Court was willing to assume that the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty if he had known about the defect at 
the time of his plea, and yet it nonetheless held that he had forfeited 
the claim by entering his plea of guilty.31 These decisions suggest 
that Blackledge cannot really be designed to be a test of material-
ity. 
Another possible explanation of the Blackledge rule is that it pro-
vides relief for defective guilty pleas in which the defects have not 
already been taken into consideration in the course of plea negotia-
tions between the defendant and the state. After all, so the argu-
ment goes, we do not want to use a constitutional defect to overturn 
a conviction if the defendant has already gotten the full benefit of 
the defect as part of a negotiated plea. With most guilty pleas, how-
ever, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know what was implicitly 
taken into account in the course of negotiatiqns. Thus, because of 
the difficulty of reconstructing plea negotiations and because of the 
state's interests of finality, it might be assumed that all but the most 
31. In United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1969), 
vacated sub nom. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Second Circuit 
held that the defendants could vacate their guilty pleas if they could show that "the 
plea was substantially motivated by a coerced confession the validity of which 
[the defendants were] unable, for all practical purposes, to contest." 409 F.2d at 
1023. In vacating the judgment of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court in 
McMa11n implicitly rejected that standard. 397 U.S. at 766. See also 397 U.S. at 
783 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 
790 (1970), the Court, although it assumed that the defendant's confession played 
a part in his decision to plead guilty, precluded him from attacking his conviction 
on that ground. 397 U.S. at 796-97. Cf. 397 U.S. at 812-13 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the conviction was invalid if unconstitutional capital punishment 
scheme motivated the guilty plea). Finally, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970), the Court assumed arguendo that the defendant would not have pleaded 
guilty but for the defect in the capital punishment statute, and yet it precluded him 
from attacking his conviction on that ground. 397 U.S. at 750. 
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complete defenses are always taken into account in a defendant's de-
cision to plead guilty. 
In other words, Blackledge may be designed to separate negoti-
ated from nonnegotiated defenses. The argument would proceed as 
follows: curable defenses are the natural subject for plea negotia-
tions because, by their very nature, they carry no certain assurance 
that their assertion will prevent the state from obtaining a valid con-
viction at trial; yet, as a matter of proof, it is always difficult to de-
termine whether a defendant who pleads guilty has taken his 
defenses into account in entering his plea. Consequently, as a rule 
of practice, it is fair to assume that wherever a defendant pleads 
guilty in the face of a curable error, he must have explicitly or im-
plicitly accounted for the error. Conversely, incurable defenses are 
not an appropriate subject for plea negotiations because, by their 
nature, they operate as complete defenses: no defendant (who 
wishes to contest prosecution) would ever use a complete defense 
as a bargaining chip to obtain a mere reduction in charge or sentence 
when he could use it to bar conviction and sentence altogether. 
Consequently, it is fair to assume that whenever a defendant pleads 
guilty in the face of an incurable error, he could not have been aware 
of the error or have used the error as a bargaining chip in his plea 
negotiations and, therefore, now deserves an opportunity to assert 
it in his defense. 
There are several problems with this explanation of Blackledge. 
To begin with, if the purpose of the rule is to distinguish cases 
on whether or not there has been bargaining over the constitutional 
defenses, the rule is not very useful, because we cannot assume that 
a defendant never bargains over incurable defects. To be sure, if 
a defendant is confident that he has a complete defense, he is hardly 
likely to use the defense as a negotiating device to obtain only a re-
duction in sentence or charge. But a defendant will often be unsure 
about the validity of his defense and may prefer to use his ostensibly 
complete defense as a bargaining chip to obtain partial relief in sen- -
tence or charge through negotiation, rather than press for a final rul-
ing one way or the other.32 
Furthermore, if it were really the Court's purpose in Blackledge 
to distinguish cases on whether or not there has been negotiation on 
the constitutional error, the Court would have to allow a defendant 
to assert such defenses whenever he could actually prove that he did 
32. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 37 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
See also text at notes 80-81 infra. 
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not negotiate at all, or that the negotiations did not take account of 
the alleged error. Yet the Court is unwilling to do so. In Tollett, 
for example, the record showed that neither the defendant nor the 
prosecutor considered the grand jury defect in their negotiations, for 
both were simply unaware of it; yet the Court barred the defendant 
from relying on the defect to challenge his plea.33 
Another conceivable rationale is that Blackledge identifies for 
relief those cases in which the state simply has no interest in preserv-
ing ·a criminal conviction. Suppose, for example, that a defendant 
pleads guilty to the crime of miscegenation, that the anti-miscegena-
tion statute is later declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal pro-
tection, and that the decision is made retroactive. Obviously, the de-
fendant, despite his guilty plea, would have a right to challenge his 
conviction under Blackledge because the constitutional error is incur-
able. Moreover, if he were asked to explain why he should be al-
lowed to challenge his conviction, he might well say that his defense 
demonstrates that the state has "no interest" in preserving the effects 
of his conviction because, by declaring the miscegenation statute un-
constitutional, a court has held that the state has no interest in mak-
ing racial intermarriage a crime. 34 
One may ask, however, whether it is sensible to conclude 
that a state has "no interest" in punishing conduct that its legis-
lature has explicitly determined to be criminal and that its executive 
officers have specifically resolved to prosecute. 35 Furthermore, 
33. 411 U.S. at 267. The United States court of appeals had affirmed the 
granting of a writ of habeas corpus to the defendant because he "neither knew nor 
could have known of the [grand jury] right at the time he entered his plea." Hender-
son v. Tollett, 459 F.2d 237, 242 n.5 (6th Cir. 1972), revd., 411 U.S. 258 (1973), 
Similarly, the district court had made the finding that defendant's original counsel 
had not objected to the indictment: "quite simply, because the possibility never oc-
curred to him." 342 F. Supp. 113, 115 (M.D. Tenn. 1971). At an earlier stage of 
the litigation, one judge concluded that "[n]o lawyer in this State would have ever 
thought of objecting to the fact that Negroes did not serve on the Grand Jury in 
Tennessee in 1948." State ex rel. Henderson v. Russell, 459 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1970) (Galbreath, J., concurring). 
34. This rationale is advanced in Note, supra note 4, at 1447 (a defendant who 
had pleaded guilty should be permitted to attack his conviction on the ground that 
the statute defining his crime is unconstitutional, "[b]ecause there is no legitimate 
governmental interest served by securing [such] convictions"). See United States 
v. Broadus, 450 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Liguori, 430 F.2d 
842, 849 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 948 (1971). 
35. To be sure, one can say that the fact that a statute is held unconstitutional 
shows that the state now has "no interest" in prosecuting under it. But that begs 
the question: the fact that a statute is declared unconstitutional does not mean the 
state has "no interest" in enforcing the statute; it merely means that the state's in-
terests are overridden by the defendant's constitutional interests. See note 36 infra. 
For example, there is nothing irrational about anti-miscegenation statutes: such 
statutes existed until recently in most states of the Union, and presumably would still 
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even if the rationale explains cases in which the accused is arguing 
that his conduct cannot constitutionally be made a crime, it does not 
explain all cases in which the accused has a complete defense to 
conviction. In Blackledge itself, for example, the defendant did not 
go so far as to contend that the state had no interest in prosecuting 
him for the felony of assault with intent to kill; instead, he argued 
that the state should have charged him with the felony initially, and 
not as a response to his decision to take a de novo appeal from his 
misdemeanor conviction. Similar reasoning applies with regard to 
other defenses, such as those of double jeopardy, speedy trial, and 
presidential pardon. In each case, although the defense would bar 
the possibility of conviction, it does nothing to abrogate the state's 
interest in prosecution. Thus, far from being cases in which the state 
has no interest in prosecution, these are cases in which the state's 
interest is merely outweighed by interests of the accused. 36 
exist in some states today if the Supreme Court had not declared them unconstitu-
tional. Moreover, it took the Court thirteen years following Brown v. Board of 
Education to summon up the courage to declare such statutes invalid. The Court 
did have a chance in 1955 to invalidate such statutes on equal protection grounds, 
but it apparently felt that the country was not yet ready for that step. See Nairn 
v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), 350 U.S. 985 (1956); Miller & Barron, The Supreme 
Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Pre-
liminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1224 (1975). By refusing to consider the 
validity of such statutes in 1955, the Court implicitly recognized that the states had 
a perceived interest in making interracial marriage a crime-a perceived interest per-
haps as strong as the states' interest in maintaining racially segregated public schools. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that it was the states' interest in preventing miscegena-
tion that ultimately explained their resistance to racially integrated public schools. 
See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 158, 195, 266, 672, 751 (1976). Although the 
Court eventually invalidated the miscegenation statutes in Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967), Loving is itself graphic evidence that as late as 1967 the State of 
Virginia considered its interest in prohibiting miscegenation to be sufficiently strong 
to justify criminal prosecution. 
36. By saying the state has "no interest" in preserving a conviction, one may 
mean that no rational purpose is served by the conviction. However, the statement 
is certainly false with respect to convictions barred by double jeopardy and probably 
false even for convictions based on unconstitutional statutes (see note 35 supra): 
convictions do serve a rational purpose in those cases; otherwise, presumably, the 
state would not be defending them. On the other hand, by saying the state has 
"no interest" in preserving a conviction, one may mean that its interests in conviction 
are nullified by constitutional concerns. But, that would then be true with respect 
to every constitutional defense to conviction, including the grand jury defense in Tol-
lett, see text at note 23 supra, and the defenses at issue in the Brady trilogy, see 
note 29 supra. The rationale in these cases has to be that conviction is prohibited 
by the Constitution not because the state has no interest in preserving the convic-
tions, but because the state's interests are outweighed by the defendant's interests. 
To be sure, in weighing the state's interest in conviction against the defendant's 
interest in asserting his constitutional defenses, one may be justified in drawing a 
distinction between "curable" and "incurable" defenses for purposes of deciding 
whether to permit a defendant to set aside a guilty plea. Indeed, it is precisely 
the purpose of this article to justify such a distinction. Once this distinction has 
been justified, some readers may find it useful to describe the cases in which collat-
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Yet another possible rationale is the one advanced in a footnote 
in Menna: a plea of guilty is a confession of "factual guilt"; once 
a defendant has confessed that the alleged facts against him are true, 
there is no need to be concerned with defenses relating to the estab-
lishment of factual guilt. 37 Under this analysis, the guilty plea 
renders "irrelevant" those defenses designed to protect a factually 
innocent defendant from wrongful conviction-i.e., defenses relating 
to the integrity of the factfinder, the admission of evidence, and 
the burden of proof. On the other hand, because a guilty plea is 
nothing more than an admission of factual guilt, it does not (and con-
stitutionally cannot) have any effect on defenses that operate without 
regard to whether the alleged facts against the defendant are true. 
This view was expressed by Justice White in another context: 
[F]ederal constitutional principles simply preclude the setting aside 
of a state conviction by a federal court where the defendant's guilt 
has been conclusively established by a voluntary and intelligent plea 
of guilty. Labels aside, a guilty plea for federal purposes is a judicial 
admission of guilt conclusively establishing a defendant's factual 
guilt,38 
There are several problems with this rationale. First, as already 
indicated, it does not succeed in explaining the rule in Blackledge, 
because there is no necessary correspondence between defenses that 
can be "cured" and defenses relating to "factual guilt," or between 
complete defenses and defenses relating to "legal guilt."89 Accord-
ingly, even if Menna could stand on its own as an independent rule 
of forfeiture, it cannot be understood as an explanation of the rule 
in Blackledge. 
eral attack is permitted as cases in which the state has "no interest" in conviction. 
But this "no interest" label is useful only after one has identified the justification 
for treating "incurable" defenses differently from others; it is of no use in trying 
to discover what that justification is. The same thing is true of the "jurisdictional" 
label: once we have explained why a certain category of defenses survives a plea 
of guilty, we may find it useful to describe the category as "jurisdictional" defenses. 
See Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARv. 
L. REv. 564, 572 (1977). But calling a defense "jurisdictional" is a conclusion, 
not an explanation: it does nothing to explain why the defense should be deemed 
to survive a guilty plea. 
37. 423 U.S. at 62-63 n.2. 
38. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 299 (1975) (White, J., dissenting). 
See also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 648 (1976) (White, J., concurring). 
39. For example, the defense of discriminatory prosecution operates without re-
gard to whether the defendant is factually guilty of the crime charged, see note 23 
supra. Accordingly, as a defense relating to "legal guilt" within the meaning of 
Menna, it should be treated as a defense that cannot be forfeited by a plea of guilty; 
and yet it is also a defense that is capable of being "cured" within the meaning 
of Blackledge (and therefore forfeitable), because the case can also be reinstated 
as part of a program of nondiscriminatory prosecution. Conversely, the "speedy 
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Secondly, even if the Menna footnote was intended to be under-
stood as creating a new rule independent of Blackledge, it must fail 
because there is no apparent constitutional justification for the new 
rule. Until now, of course, we have assumed that the Menna foot-
note was merely an attempt to restate and illuminate the rule in 
Blackledge, and we have seen that it fails in that respect. But what 
if Menna was intended as a new rule of forfeiture independent of 
Blackledge? Or what if the Court in Menna intended to overrule 
Blackledge and replace it with a new rule? In that event, if Menna 
is to stand by itself, we must ask whether there is any constitutional 
justification for a rule of forfeiture that distinguishes between defen-
ses relating to "factual guilt" (which are forfeitable) and defenses 
relating to "legal guilt" (which are not forfeitable). 
Unfortunately, Menna cannot stand on its own as an independent 
rule of forfeiture. For one thing, the Court in Menna failed to ex-
plain the source of its authority to treat the guilty plea there as an 
admission of "factual" rather than "legal" guilt. After all, Menna 
was a state case involving the effect of a guilty plea in state court; 
it is up to New York to define the preclusive effect of guilty pleas 
in its courts, and, indeed, the New York courts in Menna had already 
determined that under state law a guilty plea operated as a forfeiture 
of all defenses, including the defense of double jeopardy. Conse-
quently, if the Court in Menna is understood as deciding that a plea 
of guilty is nothing more than an admission of "factual guilt" under 
the laws of New York, one must question the source of its jurisdiction 
to make that judgment in opposition to the opinion of the highest 
court in the state. 
Furthermore, even if Menna had been a federal case or even 
if the Court had jurisdiction to define the preclusive effect of 
the guilty plea under domestic law, the Court failed to explain why 
a guilty plea should be understood to be a conclusive admission of 
"factual guilt." The Court could hardly have been making an em-
pirical judgment, because experience suggests that defendants usu-
ally plead guilty not ·because they wish to confess the truth of the 
facts alleged against them, but because they recognize the state will 
probably succeed in establishing those facts at trial.40 Empirically, 
trial" defense operates in large part to protect defendants who are factually innocent 
of the crime charged (see note 25 supra); accordingly, it is a forfeitable Menna 
defense because it relates to "factual" guilt; and yet it is also a nonforfeitable Black-
ledge defense, incapable of being "cured,'' because the only remedy for the violation 
is a dismissal with prejudice. 
40. See generally Nagel & Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilib-
rium Models: Parts I & II, 51 IND. L.J. 987 (1976), 52 IND. L.J. 1 (1977). See 
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a guilty plea is usually nothing more than a prediction about probabil-
ity of conviction at trial; as a measure of factual guilt, then, it is usu-
ally no more reliable than the defendant's prediction of the outcome 
of trial, and, in any event, it is certainly not conclusive proof of 
factual guilt.41 Consequently, in concluding that a guilty plea is con-
clusive proof of factual guilt, the Court could scarcely have been 
making an empirical statement. 
This brings us to the real issue in Menna. We must assume that 
the Court did not decide that a guilty plea is nothing but an admission 
of factual guilt under state law, because it had no jurisdiction to do 
so; nor did it decide that a guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt 
as an empirical matter, because that is simply not true. Rather, in 
deciding that the guilty plea in Menna operated as a forfeiture only 
of defenses relating to factual guilt, the Court made a constitutional 
judgment: it held that insofar as state law provided for the forfeiture 
of a defense not relating to factual guilt, i.e., defenses relating to 
"legal" guilt, the state law of forfeiture was unconstitutional. Thus, 
Menna stands for the proposition that for purposes of forfeiture, the 
states have constitutional authority to treat a guilty plea as if it is 
an admission of factual guilt, but not as if it is an admission of legal 
guilt. 
But the above merely restates, rather than justifies, the rule in 
Menna. The truly important questions remain to be answered. 
Why does the Constitution permit a state to treat a guilty plea as 
if it were a conclusive admission of factual guilt, contrary to our ex-
perience? Conversely, why does the Constitution forbid a state from 
treating a guilty plea as if it were also an admission of "legal guilt?" 
If these "legal" defenses can be waived (and the Court assumes they 
can), 42 why does the Constitution prohibit a state from treating a 
also Note, supra note 36, at 573-74; Note, supra note 4, at 1444 n.56. In Brady, 
Justice White assumed that at least some guilty pleas are based on the defendant's 
perception of the strength of the state's case against him. 397 U.S. at 756-58. In 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 36-37 (1970), the Court also recognized 
that defendants who believe they are factually innocent may nonetheless plead guilty 
because of the strength of the state's case against them. 
41. Indeed, the Court conceded in Brady that guilty pleas are no more reliable 
than full trials as indicators of factual guilt: "This is not to say that guilty plea 
convictions hold no hazards for the innocent . . . . This mode of conviction is 
no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury." 397 U.S. at 757-
58. For an analysis of the extent to which guilty pleas may be less reliable than 
trial verdicts, see Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices i11 the 
Federal Courts, 89 HAR.v. L. REv. 293 (1975) (indicating that many defendants who 
now plead guilty would be acquitted if they went to trial). 
42. The "legal" defense of double jeopardy, for example, is one that can be 
waived. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 35 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 
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guilty plea as if it were a final admission of legal guilt? Are the 
constitutional defenses relating to legal guilt more important than 
those relating to factual guilt? Is the defense of double jeopardy 
more important than the privilege against self-incrimination? These 
are the questions that must be answered if we are to assume that 
Menna is to be taken seriously as a new rule of forfeiture. If (as 
I suspect) there is no satisfactory answer, then we must assume that, 
unlike the distinction between "curable" and "incurable" defenses,43 
there is no constitutional justification for the distinction between de-
fenses relating to "factual guilt" and defenses relating to "legal 
guilt."44 
Thus far I have explored and rejected four possible rationales 
to explain the rule in Blackledge. There remains another, more 
satisfactory possibility: the rule in Blackledge might be designed to 
identify those cases in which to set aside a conviction based on a 
guilty plea places the state in no worse a position with respect to 
its ability to obtain a valid conviction against the defendant at trial 
than it occupied before entry of the plea. 
The state, which has a general interest in the finality of all con-
victions, has a particularly great interest in the finality of convictions 
based on guilty pleas. If a conviction based on a trial is later set 
aside, the state faces the difficult task of proving again that the de-
fendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The task is difficult 
because it is never easy to sustain such a burden of proof, and the 
task becomes more difficult as the time period between the alleged 
criminal act and trial lengthens. Yet the state at least has the advan-
tage of having once prepared its case for trial and of having pre-
served much, if not all, of its evidence in a form that is admissible 
at trial. On the other hand, if a guilty plea is later set aside, the 
state is in a much worse position vis-a-vis the defendant with respect 
to its ability to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
state typically does not prepare cases terminating in a guilty plea as 
thoroughly as those destined for trial. Even if it prepares a guilty 
plea case as thoroughly, it does not preserve the case in a form that 
is readily admissible against the defendant should he now choose to 
go to trial. As a result, if a conviction based in a guilty plea is set 
See also authorities cited in Ballou, "Jurisdictional" Indictments, Informations and 
Complaints: An Unnecessary Doctrine, 29 ME. L. REV. 1, 16 n.112 (1977). 
43. There is a defensible rationale for the distinction between curable and incur-
able errors. See text accompanying notes 44-49 infra. 
44. Of course, Menna can be rationalized if it is reinterpreted to be nothing but 
a restatement of Blackledge. See note 49 infra. 
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aside, the state may well find itself unable to prove the defendant 
guilty at trial, even if it would have been able to do so had he or-
iginally pleaded innocent and gone to trial. 45 
The rule in Blackledge is ideally suited to further this interest 
in the finality of guilty pleas. It holds that a defendant is not per-
mitted to challenge a guilty plea because of a constitutional error that 
is "curable" since, even where an error can be cured, the entry of 
the plea itself may have impaired the state's ability thereafter to 
prove the defendant guilty at trial. . Of course, one can never know 
for sure whether the state would have succeeded in proving its case 
if the defendant had originally gone to trial rather · than pleaded 
guilty, but it is not unfair to assume that the state relied on the plea 
to its detriment, particularly because the entry of the plea has itself 
made the issue so difficult to resolve afterward with any precision. 
Conversely a defendant is permitted to challenge a guilty plea be-
cause of a constitutional error that is incurable. In this case, the state 
is in precisely the same position after the entry of the guilty plea 
as it occupied beforehand with respect to its ability to prove the de-
fendant guilty at trial, beca_use the error would always have pre-
vented it from obtaining a valid conviction at trial. 46 
To be sure, the state obviously loses something when a guilty 
plea is set aside: it loses the benefit of a conviction against a de-
fendant who has confessed judgment. But if the state's interest in 
preserving such convictions were alone sufficient to justify the for-
feiture of antecedent errors, it would justify the forfeiture of all 
45. Both the majority and dissenters in McMann admitted that the controlling 
factor in the decision was the state's interest in the finality of convictions based 
on guilty pleas: "What is at stake in this phase of the case is ... whether, years 
later, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their [guilty] pleas, which were 
perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice between admitting their guilt 
and putting the state to its proof." 397 U.S. at 773 (emphasis added). Cf. 397 
U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("what is essentially involved both in the in-
stant case and in Brady and Parker is nothing less than the determination of the 
Court to preserve the sanctity of virtually all judgments obtained by means of guilty 
pleas"). See also Blackledge v. Allison, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 1628 (1977) (the state 
has an interest in according guilty pleas "a great measure of finality"). Reasonable 
people may differ, of course, on whether the state's interest in the finality of guilty 
pleas should outweigh the defendant's interest in asserting his constitutional defenses. 
Cf. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 252-53 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether the state's interest in finality justifies "a strict system of for-
feitures"). This, however, is the essential issue to be resolved in these cases, not 
whether the defendant made a decision to ''waive" his rights. See note 4 supra and 
accompanying text. 
46. Vacating the plea [because of a "complete" constitutional defense] does not 
present the United States with the arduous task of attempting, years after the 
trial would originally have taken place, to piece together a case for the prosecu-
tion. 
United States v. Sams, 521 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). 
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errors, both curable and incurable. Consequently, if the distinction 
in Blackledge between curable and incurable errors is sound, it must 
be because the state has no interest-or, at least, no sufficient inter-
est-in preserving a conviction simply because the defendant once 
made a deliberate decision to forgo constitutional opportunities to 
contest the state's case. It must mean that the state's mere expec-
tation in the finality of the conviction is insufficient, by itself, to over-
ride the defendant's interest in asserting constitutional defenses.47 
Rather, in order to preserve a conviction in the face of constitu-
tional challenge, the state must make a stronger showing of interest: 
it must make a showing of actual prejudice. It must be able to claim 
that by pleading guilty, the defendant caused the state to change its 
position to its actual disadvantage; in effect, it must be able to claim 
that it relied to its detriment on the finality of the defendant's plea. 
Thus, when a guilty plea is challenged on the basis of a curable error, 
the state can almost always allege in good faith that it relied on the 
finality of the conviction and, in doing so, lost valuable opportunities 
to gather and present a successful case against the defendant at 
trial. 48 With respect to incurable errors, on the other hand, the state 
can never honestly allege that it relied to its detriment on the defend-
ant's plea, because an incurable error invalidates the state's case from 
the outset: when a state's litigating position is hopeless from the be-
ginning, there is nothing a plea of guilty can do to worsen it. 
In short, the rule in Blackledge is designed not to preserve con-
victions, but to preserve the state's opportunity to obtain valid convic-
tions at trial. This ultimately explains the difference in the finality 
of guilty pleas depending on whether they are challenged for curable 
or incurable errors. Moreover, this may also explain what the Court 
was trying to say in Menna when it distinguished between "factual" 
and "legal" guilt. Thus far we have assumed that by "factual" guilt 
the Court in Menna intended to refer to actual guilt; indeed, in all 
likelihood, that is probably what the Court did intend. But it is also 
possible that by referring to a guilty plea as an admission of "factual" 
guilt, the Court meant that a guilty plea is merely an admission by 
47. See Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 266 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(the state's "claim [of] disappointed expectations" in the finality of a conviction 
is not sufficient to preclude a defendant from asserting constitutional defenses, absent 
an additional showing of "specific and substantial harm"). 
48. An exception to this rule of forfeiture may be justified if the defendant can 
actually show that the state did not rely to its detriment on the plea. See Dukes 
v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 257 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); 406 U.S. at 264-
71 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267-68 (1971) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also note 69 infra. 
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the defendant that if the case had gone to trial, the state could have 
successfully proved the "facts" alleged against him. If that is what 
the Court intended (and that conclusion is not inconceivable), then 
Menna can be accepted as a crude restatement of the Blackledge 
rationale. 49 
If this analysis of Blackledge is correct, it leads us to some gen-
eral conclusions about the nature of forfeiture. First, the forfeiture 
of constitutional defenses is justified not by the deliberate and volun-
tary consent of the defendant (as is said to be true of waiver), but 
by the overriding interests of the state. Secondly, constitutional de-
fenses in criminal procedure, like other constitutional rights, are de-
fined by a balance between the interest of the individual and the 
interest of the state: in this case, we balance the interest of the de-
fendant in asserting the values protected by the particular constitu-
tional defense at issue against the interest of the state in preserving 
its opportunity to obtain a conviction at trial. The magnitude of the 
defendant's respective interest is the same in each case, but the 
state's interests differ depending on the nature of the defense. In 
the case of curable defenses, the state is prejudiced when a guilty 
plea is set aside, because entry of the plea may be assumed to have 
placed the state at a disadvantage with respect to its ability to obtain 
a conviction against the defendant at trial. On the other hand, in the 
case of an incurable defense, the state is not prejudiced by the entry 
of the guilty plea, because it would never have been able to obtain a 
conviction at trial. Thus, the difference between forfeitable and non-
49. Thus far we have understood Menna to say that a guilty plea is a conclusive 
admission of "factual guilt" and, as such, operates as a forfeiture of all defenses 
relating to the claim that the defendant is factually innocent of the crime charged. 
Unfortunately, as we have seen, this construction of Menna is both inconsistent with 
the Court's prior cases and insupportable as a matter of policy. See notes 23-28 
& 37-44 supra and accompanying text. Without doing too much violence to the 
language of the footnote, however, we can restate Menna in a manner that is con-
sistent with Blackledge; when a defendant pleads guilty, he agrees to forgo the right 
to go to trial; he thus forgoes the right to demand that the state prove its case 
against him and relieves the state of the burden of engaging in the factfinding pro-
cess at trial; as a result, he forfeits defenses that, if valid, would put the state to 
the test of going to trial to prove the facts alleged against him. Thus, in the language 
of Menna, a guilty plea is an admission of "factual guilt" in the sense that it is 
an admission that tlze government could have proved tlze facts alleged against him 
if it had gone to trial. To be sure, by this analysis of Menna, a guilty plea is 
not an admission that the defendant is actually guilty of the facts alleged against 
him; if it were, then he would forfeit not only defenses related to the state's evidence 
at trial, but also the defenses of double jeopardy and speedy trial, which are designed 
to protect defendants who are factually innocent. Rather, by this analysis, a guilty 
plea is an admission of "factual" guilt only to the extent that it admits that the 
state would have succeeded in proving its factual case at trial. Thus the defendant 
may still assert those defenses which, if valid, would always preclude the state from 
obtaining a valid conviction even if it were entirely successful at trial. 
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forfeitable rights in the context of the guilty plea is the difference be-
tween rights that are outweighed by a conflicting state interest and 
rights that are not in conflict with a controlling state interest. 50 
In sum, the analysis of forfeiture in criminal procedure is no 
different from the analysis of constitutional rights in other contexts: 
it requires one to identify the nature of the defendant's interests, to 
identify the nature and magnitude of the state's interest, and to strike 
a balance between the two in light of alternatives for achieving their 
respective goals. 
IL THE FORFEITURE OF DEFENSES BY RULES OF TIMING: 
AN EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL RULE 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12 
A criminal defendant can forfeit his constitutional defenses in 
ways other than by pleading guilty, most commonly by failing to com-
ply with rules requiring that pretrial defenses be asserted in a timely 
fashion. Many courts have ruled that a criminal defendant must 
raise his grand jury objections before trial or forgo the opportunity 
to raise them at all. The Supreme Court, in tum, has upheld the 
forfeiture of constitutional defenses because of the defendant's 
failure to comply with such rules, despite the fact that the defend-
ant's failure to assert his defenses in timely fashion did not represent 
an informed or deliberate decision to forgo them. 
50. This rationale for forfeiture in the context of the guilty plea finds support 
in decisions in other areas of criminal procedure. In Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 
337 (1970), for example, the defendant was held to have lost his constitutional right 
to be present at bis trial because of his misconduct in the courtroom. As Michael 
Tigar points out, however, it is difficult to square the decision with traditional notions 
of waiver, because the defendant in Allen insisted throughout the proceedings that 
be wanted to remain in the courtroom. Tigar, supra note 1, at 11. Rather, the 
real justification for the decision is that the defendant "forfeited" his right to be 
present by his misconduct: that is, even though the defendant continued in his de-
sire to remain in the courtroom, his constitutional right to be present was outweighed 
by the state's overriding interest in being able to proceed with the trial in an orderly 
fashion. Cf. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
1345 (4th ed. 1974) (right to be present forfeited by failure to appear). Yale Kami-
sar came to this same conclusion more than five years ago in an unpublished mem-
orandum to the Uniform Commissioners on State Laws: 
[I]t now seems clear to [me] that we should not be dealing with "waiver" of 
constitutional rights but rather with the question: Under what circumstances 
does defendant's misconduct work a / orf eiture of his right to be personally 
present? The defendant who voluntarily absents himself from his trial after it 
bas commenced or who engages in intolerably disruptive and offensive conduct 
during the trial does not really "agree" to be tried in his absence or "intention-
ally relinquish" bis right to be present. Rather he loses or forfeits his right to 
be personally present by way of penalty for violating certain obligations or con-
ditions. 
Y. Kamisar, Memorandum on Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure 5-6 (April 
1972) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review) (emphasis 
original). 
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In Davis v. United States,51 for example, the defendant was tried 
and convicted in federal court without having challenged the com-
position of the grand jury that indicted him. Three years later, he 
petitioned for relief from his conviction, arguing that the indicting 
grand jury had been unconstitutionally impaneled; in support of his 
claim, he asserted that his failure to raise the defense before trial 
was inadvertent and not the kind of deliberate act associated with 
traditional concepts of waiver. The Court did not dispute the de-
fendant's allegations concerning waiver; nor did it find that he had 
decided to relinquish his grand jury defense. Nonetheless, it held 
that he had forfeited his right to raise the grand jury objection by 
failing to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(2), which requires that such a defense be raised, if at all, 
before trial: 
We believe that the necessary effect of the congressional adoption of 
Rule 12(b)(2) is to provide that a claim once waived [forfeited] 
pursuant to that Rule may not later be resurrected, either in the 
criminal proceedings or in federal habeas, in the absence of the show-
ing of "cause" which that Rule requires. We therefore hold that the 
waiver [forfeiture] standard expressed in Rule 12(b)(2) governs an 
untimely claim of grand jury discrimination, not only during the 
criminal proceeding, but also later on collateral review.52 
The Court subsequently reached the same conclusion in a case in-
volving a state-court defendant's failure to comply with a comparable 
state rule of procedure governing the timeliness of grand jury objec-
tions. 53 
The operation of rule 12 provides a good test of whether the 
constitutional standards applicable to forfeiture by guilty plea are 
relevant in other contexts. The rule divides all defenses into three 
categories: (1) defenses that must be raised before trial or be for-
feited; (2) defenses that must be raised by the end of trial or be 
forfeited; and (3) defenses that may be raised at any time during 
the pendency of the proceedings. I shall examine these three 
classes of defenses to determine whether the applicable standards 
of forfeiture can be justified when examined in light of the consti-
tutional standards that prevail in the context of guilty pleas. 
A. Defenses That Must Be Raised Before Trial 
Rule 12 provides that a defendant must raise before trial all 
51. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). 
52. 411 U.S. at 242. 
53. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). 
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defenses that are "capable of determination without trial of the gen-
eral issue" and that fall within any of the following categories: 
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the 
prosecution; or 
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information (other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court 
or to charge an offense ... ); or 
(3) Motions to suppress evidence; or 
(4) Requests for discovery under Rule 16; or 
(5) Requests for a severance of charges or defendants under Rule 
14.54 
Categories (3) through (5) are self-explanatory. Categories (1) 
and (2) are understood to include defenses concerning selection and 
composition of the grand jury, the procedures of the grand jury, juris-
diction over the person of the defendant, selection of the petty jury, 
and the form of the indictment or information including claims that 
the charging paper is duplicitous or multiplicitous. 55 All five cate-
gories of defenses are relevant to the present inquiry because each 
can contain defenses that are constitutional in origin. It is also impor-
tant to observe that these rule 12(b) defenses are all "curable" 
within the meaning of Blackledge: if raised and corrected before 
trial, each would leave the way open to the state to obtain a valid 
conviction at trial. 
Having enumerated these defenses, rule 12 further provides that 
the defendant's failure to raise them before trial "shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but that the court for cause shown may grant relief 
from the waiver."56 By now it should be clear that what the rule 
calls "waiver" is not waiver in the traditional sense, since it is not 
a deliberate, informed decision by the defendant to relinquish a de-
fense in his favor. The defendant in Davis did not choose to forgo 
his grand jury objection; in fact, he was completely unaware of it 
at the time he went to trial. 57 And yet, by failing to raise the de-
54. FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b). The current rule, as amended in 1975, is slightly 
different from the terms of the rule as it existed at the time of Davis v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). ¥or the terms of the nile as it then existed, see 1 
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 394 (1969). 
55. See 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 193, at 406-09. 
56. FED. R. CruM. P. 12(f). 
51. A similar case in this regard is McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), 
where the defendant could hardly have been expected to raise the Jackson v. Denno 
defense at the time he pleaded guilty, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) 
(due process right to determination that confession was validly given), because that 
case had not yet been decided. The same was true of the unconstitutional death-
penalty defense in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
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fense before trial, he lost it forever, both for purposes of direct ap-
peal and for purposes of collateral attack. Thus, when the rule 
speaks of "waiver," it refers to what we would call "forfeiture"-
the loss of constitutional rights by operation of law, without regard 
to the state of mind or intention of the defendant. 
It should also be clear that the rule of forfeiture under rule 12 
is different from the rule for guilty pleas. Forfeiture by a guilty plea 
is justified by the state's interest in preserving convictions in every 
case in which the state might have obtained a conviction following 
trial if the case had not terminated in a guilty plea. As a result, 
by pleading guilty, a defendant forfeits all defenses except those that 
would have precluded the state from ever obtaining a conviction 
against him at trial; moreover, he forfeits those curable defenses 
whether or not he was ever realistically in a position to assert them. 
In light of Davis, forfeiture under rule 12 is more limited than 
forfeiture by guilty plea. The main difference is that a defendant 
does not forfeit defenses under Davis unless he was realistically in 
a position to assert them before trial. Thus, the defendant in Davis 
would not have forfeited his grand jury defense if he could have 
shown cause for not having raised the defense before trial. In other 
words, in striking a balance between the defendant's interests in as-
serting such defenses (many of which will be constitutional in origin) 
and the state's interest in blocking those defenses, the rule in Davis 
cuts off only those defenses that the defendant is reasonably capable 
of asserting before trial. 
Therefore, the pertinent question is this: why should the consti-
tutional rule of forfeiture for pretrial defenses be more generous than 
the rule for guilty pleas? It might be said in response that the dif-
ference between Tollett and Davis is not between two constitutional 
rules of forfeiture-one governing guilty pleas and the other govern-
ing pretrial defenses-but between two domestic rules of forfeiture. 
That is, the Court in Tollett was not asked to define the domestic 
rule of forfeiture for guilty pleas for the State of North Carolina; 
instead, it was presented with a state rule that a defendant forfeits 
his antecedent defenses by pleading guilty, regardless of whether he 
had "cause" for failing to assert them before entering his plea. 
Given this domestic rule of forfeiture, the Court in Tollett merely 
held that the rule was not unconstitutional, at least with respect to 
the "curable" constitutional defense at issue there. Similarly, in 
Davis the Court was not asked to define the domestic rule of for-
feiture for pretrial defenses; instead, it was presented with an exist-
ing federal rule that a defendant who stands trial does not forfeit 
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his antecedent defenses if he can show "cause" for failing to assert 
them before trial. Given that rule (which happened to be more gen-
erous than the domestic rule in Tollett), the Court merely held that 
the rule was not unconstitutional; it did not decide that a stricter do-
mestic rule of forfeiture for pretrial defenses would be unconstitu-
tional. In short, the difference between Tollett and Davis may not be 
a difference between what is constitutionally acceptable as the outer 
limit of forfeiture for guilty pleas as opposed to pretrial defenses, 
but merely a difference between two domestic rules of forfeiture, 
both of which happen to be constitutional. 
There are several problems with this explanation of the relation-
ship between Tollett and Davis. First, it- fails to explain why the 
Court took a more expansive view of forfeiture for guilty pleas than 
for pretrial defenses on the one occasion in which the Court did play 
a role in defining the domestic rule of forfeiture. To be sure, the 
Court had no authority in Tollett (a state case) to define the under-
lying rule of forfeiture for guilty pleas; it merely passed on the valid-
ity of a prior rule of forfeiture created by state law. But in Brady 
v. United States,58 which was a federal case, the Court did perform 
the common-law function of defining the domestic rule of forfeiture 
for guilty pleas in the federal courts. And in doing so, it adopted 
the broad rule that, by pleading guilty, a defendant forfeits all ante-
cedent defenses, without regard to whether he may have had "cause" 
for failing to assert them before entering his plea. Thus, in fashion-
ing a domestic rule of forfeiture for guilty pleas in federal cases, the 
Court implicitly recognized a distinction between convictions based 
on guilty pleas and convictions following trial. 
Secondly, this nonconstitutional view of Davis is difficult to 
square with Francis v. Henderson. 59 The facts in Francis were 
similar to those in Davis, in that both involved defendants who had 
been convicted at trial and were seeking to attack their convictions 
collaterally because of constitutional defects in the grand juries that 
had indicted them. However, there were several significant differ-
ences between the two cases. For one, Francis, unlike Davis, was 
a state case. Accordingly, the Court had to accept the rule of for-
feiture defined by state law and limit its review to determining the 
constitutional validity of the state rule. Furthermore, the rule for 
pretrial defenses in Francis, unlike rule 12 in Davis, was absolute: 
it required the defendant to raise his grand jury defenses before trial 
58. 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
59. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). 
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without regard to whether he had "cause" for failing to assert them 
at that time. Consequently, Francis presented the question whether 
a state has the constitutional authority to adopt a rule of forfeiture 
for pretrial defenses as broad as the rule created in Tollett and Brady 
for guilty pleas. 
In the end, the Court in Francis was able to avoid that question 
because it found that the defendant there had failed to show "cause" 
for not asserting his grand jury objection before trial. Nonetheless, 
the Court went on to say in dictum that, if the defendant in Francis 
had been able to show such cause, he would have a right to challenge 
his conviction on that ground, the state rule to the contrary notwith-
standing. 60 Hence one can interpret Francis as standing for the 
proposition that a state has no constitutional authority to prohibit a 
defendant who has been convicted at trial from attacking his convic-
tion on the basis of constitutional defenses that he had "cause" for 
not asserting before trial. 61 
60. 425 U.S. at 542. 
61. Alternatively, it might be argued that Francis is a purely statutory decision. 
By that interpretation, the exception for "cause" in Francis is not a constitutional 
requirement, but rather a new statutory standard of forfeiture implicit in the statute 
governing federal review of state convictions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). Thus, 
until recently it was assumed that criminal defendants had a federal statutory right 
to assert by writ of habeas corpus all constitutional defenses to their conviction ex-
cept defenses they had "deliberately bypassed," see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 428-
34, 438-39 (1963 ), and that the deliberate-bypass standard applied in all cases, in-
cluding review of state convictions under § 2254 and review of federal convictions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). Then, in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 
(1973 ), a § 2255 review of a federal conviction, the Court was asked to reconcile 
the implicit deliberate-bypass standard previously applied to § 2255 with the stricter 
standard explicitly set forth in FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b), which provides that all de-
fenses not raised are automatically forfeited, except for "cause" shown. The Court 
reasoned that in approving the stricter forfeiture provision of rule 12(b), Congress 
must have intended to "repeal" the more generous deliberate-bypass standard of 
§ 2255; otherwise, § 2255 would completely negate the effect of rule 12(b). Accord-
ingly, the Court concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that the forfeiture 
provision of rule 12, including its narrow exception for "cause," was intended to 
apply both at the criminal trial itself and on collateral attack under § 2255. 411 
U.S. at 241-42. Unfortunately, the same argument cannot be made in a case like 
Francis involving review of a state conviction under § 2254: the Louisiana rule 
of procedure in Francis requiring grand jury objections to be raised before trial was 
never approved by Congress. Nor is there anything inconsistent about the notion 
that Congress intended a broader standard of review to govern under § 2254 than 
exists for the trial itself under Louisiana law. 
Moreover, it might also be argued that the Court in Davis and Francis was simply 
repudiating the deliberate-bypass standard of Fay v. Noia and replacing it with a 
new statutory interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254-55 to the effect that federal and 
state rules of procedure for the timely assertion of constitutional defenses are now 
to be treated as adequate state grounds for purposes of federal habeas review. See 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 521-22 n.5 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). If 
that is what the Court was really doing, however, one must wonder where it found 
the exception to the Louisiana rule for a showing of "cause," since the state rule 
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A third problem with the nonconstitutional explanation of Davis 
and Tollett advanced above is that the Court's treatment of retro-
activity suggests that it does recognize constitutional differences be-
tween forfeiture for convictions based on trial and forfeiture for con-
victions based on guilty pleas. There is, after all, an intimate con-
nection between doctrines of retroactivity and forfeiture: if a newly 
recognized defense is constitutionally retroactive, a defendant who 
was convicted in the past is constitutionally entitled to raise the claim 
now as a defense to his conviction. Additionally, a state would have 
no constitutional authority in that event to enforce a contrary rule 
of retroactivity or to provide that the defendant's failure to raise the 
defense in the past constituted forfeiture of that defense. Conver-
sely, if a newly recognized defense is not constitutionally retroactive, 
then a defendant who was convicted in the past is not entitled to· 
raise the claim now as a defense to that conviction. By the same 
token, a state could provide that the defendant's failure to raise the 
defense in the past constituted forfeiture of the defense, despite his 
having had "cause" for being unaware of the defense at the time 
of his conviction. 
Interestingly, in the area of retroactivity the Court has drawn a 
constitutional distinction between convictions based on trials and 
convictions based on guilty pleas. In Jacksor,, v. Denno,62 for 
example, a New York defendant was convicted at trial on the basis 
of a dubious procedure for determining the validity of his out-of-
court confession. 63 The Court reversed the conviction, holding that 
the judicial procedure at issue violated the defendant's privilege 
itself contains no such exception and Federal Rule 12 applies only in federal criminal 
proceedings. Consequently, if the defendant in Francis had a right to make a show-
ing of "cause" despite the state rule of procedure to the contrary, it is most probably 
because, as a constitutional matter, the stricter Louisiana rule-which would have 
cut off his defenses without regard to any showing of "cause"-was implicitly held 
to be an inadequate state ground; at the very least, it suggests that, as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, the Court wished to avoid the constitutional implications 
of upholding an airtight system of forfeiture of that kind. These constitutional impli-
cations were certainly uppermost in the mind of Justice Brennan. See 425 U.S. 
536, 548-49 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
62. 378 U.S. 36 (1964). 
63. Consistent with the New York practice at that time, the trial court had sub-
mitted the issue of the voluntariness of Jackson's confession to the jury along with 
the other issues in the case, without ever making any independent determination 
of its own as to its admissibility. The jury was instructed that, if it found the 
confession to be involuntary, it was to disregard the confession entirely and deter-
mine guilt or innocence from the other evidence presented. The procedure was con-
stitutionally defective because, with respect to confessions the jury determined to be 
inadmissible, the procedure placed unreasonable demands on what was determined 
to be the jury's limited ability to disregard confessions once it had heard them. 378 
U.S. at 374-75. 
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against self-incrimination. The Court later held that this decision was 
constitutionally retroactive to convictions based on trials conducted 
in the past, despite the fact that defendants there had failed to as-
sert the defense at the time. The Court apparently concluded that 
the Jackson defense should apply retroactively because it involved 
a constitutional defect that affected "reliability of the fact-finding 
process"64 and because defendants should be excused for failing to 
anticipate the change of law. 
Yet in McMann v. Richardson,65 involving precisely the same 
defense, the Court came to the opposite conclusion with respect to 
convictions based on guilty pleas. The defendant in McMann, like 
the defendant in Jackson, had given the New York police an incrimi-
nating confession at a time when the New York courts still employed 
the same dubious procedure later declared invalid in Jackson. In-
stead of standing trial, however, the defendant in McMann pleaded 
guilty; later, in response to the decision in Jackson, he challenged 
his conviction, arguing that he would never have pleaded guilty if 
the state had provided a constitutionally acceptable procedure at trial 
for determining the validity of his confession. The Supreme Court 
accepted his allegations, thereby assuming that the defendant would 
not have pleaded guilty except for the constitutional defect in the 
state's procedure; in other words, it assumed that the defect affected 
the factual "integrity" of the defendant's plea. Nonetheless, the 
Court denied relief, holding that the decision in Jackson was not con-
stitutionally retroactive to defendants convicted on pleas of guilty. 00 
In short, although the defendants in McMann and Jackson were 
assumed to have been convicted because of the same constitutional 
defect, and although both could show "cause" for not having asserted 
64. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727-29 (1966). See also Tehan v. 
United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 
618, 639 & n.20 (1965). 
65. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to McMa1111 
as if it involved a single defendant, although in fact it represented a collection of 
consolidated cases involving three defendants, all similarly situated. 
66. The Court stated at one point that the procedural defect in McMa1111 had 
no bearing on the "accuracy" of the defendant's plea. 397 U.S. at 773. But imme-
diately thereafter the Court conceded that the controlling factor in the case was 
not the "integrity" of the plea at all, but rather the state's interest in the finality 
of convictions based on guilty pleas. For the view that the defects in McMa1111 
and its companion cases did affect the "integrity" of the defendants' pleas of guilty, 
see 397 U.S. at 782-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 
U.S. 790, 805 n.9 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also notes 31 & 40-
41 supra. For the view that, as far as the "integrity" of the convictions is concerned, 
there is no rational distinction between convictions based on trial and convictions 
based on guilty pleas and no rational basis, therefore, for different standards of retro-
activity, see Note, supra note 4, at 1443-44. 
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the defense earlier, a distinct constitutional rule of forfeiture was ap-
plied in each case. Hence, like Francis, McMann supports the view 
that there is a constitutional difference in the extent to which a state 
can provide for the forfeiture of criminal defenses depending on 
whether the case involves a conviction based on guilty pleas or a con-
viction based on a trial verdict. 
This discussion brings us back to our earlier question: what is 
the constitutional difference between a conviction basei:l on a guilty 
plea and a conviction based on trial that justifies different rules of 
forfeiture? Why, as a matter of domestic policy, would the federal 
courts adopt a broader rule of forfeiture for convictions based on 
guilty pleas than for convictions based on trial? Why, as a constitu-
tional matter, would the Court hold that a state has no power to adopt 
as broad a rule of forfeiture for convictions based on trials as it might 
wish to adopt for convictions based on guilty pleas? The defendant's 
interest appears to be the same in each case: a defendant (like 
McMann) who pleads guilty because of a constitutional defect in a 
procedure by which he would have been tried is in precisely the 
same position as a defendant who is tried and found guilty because 
of the defect; in each case, he has been convicted because of a con-
stitutional defect in the process; in each case, he is in a position to 
argue that he would not have been convicted had the constitutional 
defect not existed. Thus, from the defendant's standpoint, there is 
no difference between a conviction based on a guilty plea and a con-
viction following trial that would justify different constitutional stan-
dards of forfeiture. 
The real difference lies with the state's interest. The state has 
important interests in the finality of all convictions, whether based 
on guilty pleas or on verdicts following trial. If a defendant is per-
mitted to set aside a conviction based on a guilty plea because of 
a defense based on a defect that could have been cured if identi-
fied earlier, he injures the state in two ways: he puts the state to 
the burden and expense of having processed an invalid guilty plea, 
and, more importantly, he puts the state in the position of now hav-
ing to present a case it might no longer be able to prove. Similar 
state interests are affected whenever a defendant is permitted to set 
aside a conviction based on a trial because of a defect that could have 
been cured if complained of earlier. The court referred to those 
two interests in Davis: 
If its [rule 12(b) (2)] time limits are followed, inquiry into an al-
leged defect may be concluded and, if necessary, cured before the 
court, the witnesses, and the parties have gone to the burden and ex-
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pense of a trial. If defendants were allowed to flout its time limita-
tions, on the other hand, there would be little incentive to comply 
with its terms when a successful attack might simply result in a new 
indictment prior to trial. Strong tactical considerations would militate 
in favor of delaying the raising of the claim in hopes of an acquittal, 
with the thought that if those hopes did not materialize, the claim 
could be used to upset an otherwise valid conviction at a time when 
reprosecution might well be difficult. 67 
If anything, the state's interest in seeing that the defendant 
asserts his curable defenses in time to avoid "the burden and ex-
pense" of engaging in judicial procedures that will subsequently have 
to be set aside is even stronger in the context of convictions based on 
trials: if a defendant who stands trial, for example, does not assert a 
grand jury defense until after the trial is completed, he will have 
put the state to the considerable burden and expense of a trial that 
will now be invalidated. On the other hand, if a defendant who has 
pleaded guilty does not assert a grand jury defense until after entry 
of his plea, the prejudice to the state is considerably less, because the 
burden and expense of an arraignment (which takes only a few 
minutes) is considerably less than the burden and expense of a trial. 
Consequently, the justification for the constitutional distinction be-
tween the rule of forfeiture for convictions based on trial and the 
stricter rule of forfeiture for convictions based on guilty pleas must 
lie elsewhere than with the state's interest in avoiding unnecessary 
proceedings. 
The second state interest-that curable defenses be asserted in 
a timely fashion so that the state does not have to prove its case "at 
a time when reprosecution might well be difficult"-does justify the 
constitutional distinction. The state's interest here is stronger and 
more crucial with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas than 
with respect to convictions based on trials. The state is typically 
in a much worse position vis-a-vis a defendant when a guilty plea 
is set aside than when a trial verdict is set aside. As discussed 
earlier, 68 the state, obtaining a conviction based on a guilty 
plea, rarely prepares its case as carefully as it would for a trial. As 
a result, if a guilty plea is set aside, the state may well find that its 
files are inadequate, that the trail of evidence has grown cold, and 
that it is no longer in a position to prove the defendant guilty beyond 
67. 411 U.S. at 241. See also 411 U.S. at 254-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting): 
"I do not deny that there is an interest in enforcing compliance with reasonable 
procedural requirements by a system of forfeitures, so that claims will be raised at 
a time when they may easily be determined and necessary corrective action taken." 
68. See text at note 45 supra. 
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a reasonable doubt at trial. Consequently, in weighing the defend-
ant's interests in asserting constitutional defenses against the state's 
interest in the finality of guilty pleas, it makes some sense to con-
clude that the state has authority to provide for the forfeiture of all 
curable defenses, regardless of whether the defendant was reason-
ably capable of raising the defense before entering his plea. 
The state's interest in avoiding reprosecution is not nearly so 
strong in the case of retrials. When a conviction is set aside follow-
ing a trial, the state need not build its case from scratch; it has 
already completed the investigation and preparation required to take 
the case to trial. Moreover, if witnesses have become unavailable 
in the meantime, the state may offer as evidence their testimony 
from the original trial record. Consequently, in balancing the de-
fendant's interest in asserting constitutional defenses against the 
state's interest in the finality of convictions following trial, it makes 
some sense as a matter of policy to provide for the forfeiture of only 
those defenses that the defendant was reasonably able to raise before 
trial, leaving it open to him to show "cause" for not having asserted 
his defenses earlier. And, given this balance of interests, it may also 
be appropriate, as a constitutional matter, to conclude that the state 
has no power to provide for the forfeiture of constitutional defenses 
not raised before trial if the defendant can show "cause" for having 
failed to assert them in timely fashion. 69 
B. Defenses That Must Be Raised by the End of Trial 
As mentioned earlier, rule 12 divides all antecedent defenses 
into three classes: (1) those that must be raised before trial (dis-
cussed in the preceding section); (2) the defenses of failure of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction and of failure to charge an offense, which may 
69. These two rules of forfeiture-a strict rule for cases terminating in guilty 
pleas, and a more lenient rule for cases terminating in guilty verdicts-obviously 
rest on general assumptions concerning the state's different degrees of interest in 
the finality of convictions. That is, the rules assume that th~ state generally has 
a stronger interest in the finality of convictions based on guilty pleas than in the 
finality of convictions based on trial verdicts. As with all general rules, of course, 
this inevitably means that the two rules will be underinclusive in some cases and 
overinclusive in others. Some of this lack of "fit" or precision can perhaps be reme-
died by refining the rules. Thus, one might decide that the ordinary rule of forfei-
ture for guilty pleas ought not apply where a defendant can actually show that the 
state has no interest in finality. See Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 264-71 (1972) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (defendant has a constitutional right to assert his defenses 
following a plea of guilty if he acts promptly and before the state could conceivably 
suffer prejudice). Similarly, one might decide that the ordinarily more lenient rule 
of forfeiture for convictions based on trial verdicts ought not apply where the state 
can actually show special prejudice. Nonetheless, despite such refinements, there 
will always be some lack of precision in this area because of the difficulty of proving 
or disproving actual prejudice in specific cases, and because of the resulting need 
to resort to presumptions of prejudice for general categories of cases. 
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be raised "at any time during the pendency of the proceedings"; and 
(3) a residual class of defenses containing all those not specifically 
set forth in the first two classes. The rule does not explicitly state 
when these residual defenses must be asserted, but the relationship 
among the three classes implies that defenses in this third class must 
be asserted before the end of trial: 
These ... defenses [of the third class] ... may at the option of 
pleader be raised by a motion to dismiss [before trial], but he is not 
required to raise [them] at that time and may assert them at the trial 
under a plea of not guilty. Indeed the rule itself is silent on when 
they must be raised. Unlike defenses and objections in the [first] 
class, they need not be raised by timely pretrial motion. Unlike de-
fenses and objections in the [second] class, they may not be noticed 
at any stage during the pendency of the proceeding. The sensible 
resolution is that the matters now being considered are waived if not 
raised at the trial. 70 
The rule is also silent on the consequences of the defendant's failure 
to make a timely assertion of defenses in this third class; it does not 
specify, as it does with defenses in the first class, that failure to as-
sert them in a timely fashion "shall constitute waiver." However, 
because it is implicit in the rule that a defendant must raise these 
defenses before the end of trial, it is fair to assume that his failure 
to do so precludes him from asserting them later. 71 
The rule also does not describe or enumerate the particular 
defenses that fall within this residual class. Indeed, if it were not 
for the Advisory Committee Notes, one might have assumed that 
some defenses intended to be included in this class fell within the 
first class as defenses relating to defects in the institution of the 
prosecution. But in their official notes, the framers of the rule set 
forth specific examples of the defenses they intended to be included 
within the third class-"former jeopardy, former conviction, former 
acquittal, statute of limitations, [and] immunity . . . ."72 These, 
then, are the defenses that may be raised either before or during 
trial, but may not be raised after the conclusion of trial. 
The reader has probably noticed that these are all defenses that, 
if asserted before trial, would constitute complete defenses to the 
crimes charged. Indeed, the residual defenses that are constitutional 
in origin73 seem to correspond exactly with the group of "incurable" 
70. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 193, at 410. 
71. See id., § 193, at 410 n.71. But cf. note 74 infra. 
72. See id., § 193, at 402 n.38. 
73. The defenses of former jeopardy, former acquittal, former conviction, and 
bars to prosecution based on certain kinds of immunity and on presidential pardons 
are constitutional in origin. 
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defenses that, according to Blackledge, cannot constitutionally be for-
feited by a plea of guilty. The question, therefore, is this: if 
a defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty has a con-
stitutional right under Blackledge to raise certain defenses to his con-
viction at any time, how can a defendant who has been convicted 
at trial ever be prohibited from raising those same defenses to his 
conviction? If a defendant cannot constitutionally forfeit a defense 
by pleading guilty, how can he forfeit it by going to trial? 
In the last section we identified two reasons for requiring a 
defendant to assert certain defenses before trial: (1) to relieve the 
state of the burden and expense of an unnecessary trial, and (2) 
to relieve the state of the burden of trying to prove its case against 
the accused at a time when reprosecution may be difficult. The 
second interest is obviously irrelevant here, for to say that a defense 
is complete is to admit that the state is incapable of ever obtaining 
a conviction. Hence, in this respect, the state is in precisely the 
same position vis-a-vis the defendant when a completed defense is 
asserted late as when it is asserted early. The first interest is more 
significant here: the state has an administrative and financial interest 
in avoiding unnecessary trials. If a defendant who has a complete 
defense is permitted to delay his assertion of the defense until the 
state has already tried him, he will have caused the state to go to 
trial in vain. Conversely, if the state wishes to avoid the burden of 
futile proceedings, it must make the defendant pay a price for fail-
ing to raise the defense in a timely fashion. The state has a variety 
of sanctions at its disposal for that purpose, one of which is to prohibit 
the defendant from raising at trial any defense that he could have 
raised earlier and that would have rendered trial superfluous. 
Indeed, that is precisely the sanction that rule 12 uses to force the 
defendant to raise the curable defenses discussed in the preceding 
section. 
Still, there are at least two problems in using the same rationale 
here to 3ustify the forfeiture of complete defenses. First, we have 
yet to establish whether the state's administrative and financial inter-
est fo avoiding unnecessary proceedings is ever sufficient by itself 
to justify the forfeiture of constitutional defenses. The fact that the 
state has such an interest does not mean that the states's interest out-
weighs the defendant's constitutional interests. Although Davis and 
Francis stand for the proposition that the state's interest in cutting 
off constitutional defenses can outweigh the defendant's interest in 
asserting them, those cases both involved "curable" defenses; hence 
in addition to having an administrative or financial interest in their 
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timely assertion, the state there also had an interest in avoiding the 
burden of trying to retry its case at a time when reprosecution might 
be difficult. 
Secondly, even if the state's administrative and financial interest 
in avoiding unnecessary proceedings is sufficient to justify the for-
feiture of constitutional defenses (and it probably is), rule 12 cannot 
be justified on that basis, because it is not designed to further that 
interest. To protect the state from the burden of superfluous pro-
ceedings, the rule would have to treat complete defenses the same 
way it treats curable defenses, by requiring that they be asserted 
before the trial commences; in that way, it would protect itself from 
the "burden and expense" of commencing a trial that will inevitably 
fail. But rule 12 does not require that complete defenses be raised 
before trial; rather, it permits a defendant to raise such defenses at 
any time up to the end of trial, long after the state has expended 
the administrative and financial resources it would presumably wish 
to save. 
In short, we are forced to conclude that there is no constitutional 
justification for the forfeiture of complete defenses under rule 12. 
Perhaps the rule could be saved if it were redrafted to protect the 
state from the burden and expense of superfluous proceedings. For-
feiture might be justified if it were necessary to further a substantial 
state interest that could not easily be protected by alternative means; 
but, as the rule now stands, it does not further that interest and can-
not be constitutionally justified on that basis. To answer the ques-
tions posed earlier, rule 12 is unconstitutional insofar as it provides 
for the forfeiture of constitutional defenses that cannot be forfeited 
by a plea of guilty.74 
74. If our knowledge of forfeiture were limited to this context, we might assume 
that the forfeiture provision of rule 12{b)(2) was justified by the state's interest 
in preserving the convictions of persons whom it believes to be guilty of the facts 
alleged against them (and against whom there is substantial evidence of guilt). But 
we have already discovered in connection with Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 
(1974), that the state's interest in preserving the conviction of a person who may 
be factually guilty is insufficient to preclude him from asserting complete con-
stitutional defenses. See text at notes 36 & 45-49 supra. To justify such a rule, 
something more is required in the way of a state interest, such as showing that 
the state has relied to its detriment on the defendant's failure to assert the defense 
in a timely fashion. It is precisely that kind of interest that is absent from rule 
12(b) (2) as presently drafted. 
Of course, this constitutional defect in rule 12 can be eliminated by reinterpreting 
the rule to allow for the survival of complete defenses. Thus, without doing too 
much violence to the language of rule 12, one could construe it to be a rule of 
forfeiture only for purposes of direct appeal and not for purposes of collateral attack. 
By that construction, a defendant who fails to assert his defenses by the end of 
trial would lose the right to raise them on direct appeal but would preserve them 
for purposes of collateral attack. The difficulty with this solution is that it conflicts 
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C. Defenses That Can Be Raised at Any Time 
Rule 12 recognizes two defenses that can be raised "at any time 
during the pendency of the proceedings": (1) that the court has no 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense, and (2) that the 
indictment or information does not charge an offense. The rule does 
not define the meaning of "proceedings," but it is generally under-
stood that a defendant may raise such defenses at any time from the 
commencement of initial proceedings through the exhaustion of col-
lateral remedies. 75 Again, the rule does not distinguish between 
constitutional and nonconstitutional defenses, but it appears that each 
of the two defenses recognized by the rule may arise in a constitu-
tional context. Thus, the defendant who is charged with a "minor 
offense" and set to be tried before a magistrate may move to dismiss 
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, on the ground that the Consti-
tution requires that he be tried in an article ill court. Similarly, 
a defendant who is charged with a speech-related crime may move 
to dismiss the indictment for failure to state an offense, on the 
ground that the first amendment precludes the state from making 
his conduct a crime. Consequently, although these two rule 12 de-
fenses are often nonconstitutional in nature, they are relevant to our 
inquiry because they may also be derived from the Constitution. 
Significantly, these defenses are often "complete defenses" of 
precisely the kind that will survive a guilty plea under Blackledge. 
For example, if the defendant is charged with conduct that cannot 
be designated an offense because it is protected by the first amend-
ment, the government can do nothing to "cure" the defect because 
the Constitution prohibits the state from making the defendant's con-
duct a crime. To that extent, by treating such defenses as nonfor-
feitable, rule 12 reflects what we have determined to be an appropri-
ate constitutional balance between the defendant's interest in assert-
ing such defenses and the state's interest in cutting them off. 
To be sure, the state does have a legitimate interest in avoiding 
the "burden and expense" of proceeding with a trial that will eventu-
ally be terminated because of an antecedent defect in its case; ac-
cordingly, if the state wished to do so, it might have the constitutional 
authority to require that all antecedent defenses, both curable and 
with the Court's construction of rule 12 in other contexts. Thus, in Davis v. United 
States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), the Court held that the explicit forfeiture provision 
of rule 12 applied both on direct appeal and on collateral review. There is no reason 
to believe that the Court would take any different view of the rule's implicit forfei-
ture provisions. 
75. See 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 193, at 403-04. 
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incurable, be asserted before trial, absent a showing of "cause."rn 
But, as we have seen, the framers of rule 12 chose not to use the 
sanction of forfeiture to further that interest, and the state has no 
other interest that would constitutionally justify the forfeiture of com-
plete defenses. Thus, absent the one state interest that might other-
wise justify it, the provision in rule 12 for the survival of such de-
fenses is not only a matter of good policy-it is constitutionally com-
pelled because of the defendant's constitutional interest in asserting 
the defenses. 
Rule 12 goes even further than is constitutionally necessary by 
providing for the survival of defenses in this last class without re-
gard to whether they are curable or incurable. Both of these de-
fenses can, in fact, arise in a "curable" form. For example, if a 
soldier questions the competence of a military court to prosecute him 
for a civilian offense, the state can cure the objection by removing 
the case to an article ID court. Similarly, if a defendant whose con-
duct is constitutionally punishable objects to the particular way the 
offense is stated in the indictment, the state might be able to cure 
the objection by reformulating the charge. In each case, the defend-
ant is raising a constitutional claim that is less than a complete de-
fense under the circumstances. 
This feature of rule 12, however, does not present any constitu-
tional problems: the fact that the state is constitutionally prohibited 
from providing for the forfeiture of complete defenses does not mean 
that it is prohibited from providing for the survival of incomplete de.-
fenses; rather, the latter is simply a question of policy. The state 
is obviously free to be as generous as it wishes in allowing for the 
survival of defenses, so long as it satisfies minimum constitutional 
requirements. 
Ill. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORFEITURE 
AND WAIVER 
A criminal defendant can lose the right to assert constitutional 
defenses by forfeiting them or by waiving them. As we have seen, 
forfeiture occurs by operation of law without regard to the defend-
ant's state of mind and is justified by the state's interest in the final-
ity of convictions. Waiver, on the other hand, is supposedly justified 
by a completely different principle-that, once the defendant has 
76. We have already concluded that forfeiture is not constitutionally justified with 
respect to a defendant who stands trial, if his failure to raise a defense bearing on 
the integrity of the guilt-determining process is excusable. See text at notes 58-
66 supra. 
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made a free and informed decision to forgo his constitutional defen-
ses, he may constitutionally be held to the consequences of his elec-
tion. 77 Thus, while forfeiture rests on a balance between the de-
fendant's interest in asserting defenses and the state's interest in 
cutting them off, waiver is thought to be based not on any such cal-
culus of competing interests but on a concept of free choice. 
If this view of waiver is correct, it means that a defendant should 
be constitutionally capable of freely waiving certain defenses, even 
though the state has no interest that would justify their forfeiture. 
To test this conclusion, consider the following hypothetical: although 
a defendant has some reason to believe that he has been denied a 
speedy trial in violation of the sixth amendment, he nonetheless de-
cides to plead guilty. The judge informs the defendant at his ar-
raignment that, by pleading guilty, he will be waiving his privilege 
against self-incrimination and his rights to trial by jury and to con-
front witnesses against him. The judge also informs him that, by 
pleading guilty, he will also waive any speedy trial defense he might 
otherwise have. The defendant, after consulting with his attorney, 
enters a plea of guilty and receives the maximum sentence provided 
by law for the offense charged. Six months later, after consulting 
with new counsel, the defendant decides to attack his conviction on 
the ground that he was denied a speedy trial in violation of the sixth 
amendment. The prosecution opposes the motion on the ground that 
the defendant deliberately and freely waived his sixth amendment 
defense. 
It should be clear by now that the speedy-trial defense is one 
that cannot constitutionally be forfeited by a plea of guilty. Like 
the due process defense in Blackledge and the defense of double 
jeopardy, the finding that a defendant was denied a speedy trial is 
a complete defense. As with these other defenses, the .only constitu-
tionally acceptable remedy for a speedy-trial violation is dismissal 
with prejudice. Because the state has no cognizable interest in pre-
venting the defendant from asserting the defense following a plea of 
guilty, the defendant is constitutionally incapable of forfeiting the de-
fense by pleading guilty. The question, therefore, is whether the 
defendant is constitutionally capable of waiving such a defense. 
Now it might be argued that, by enforcing the waiver, the state 
is not prohibiting the defendant from doing anything he wishes but 
is merely recognizing a choice that he has already made. But that 
77. For an attempt to justify waiver in terms of free choice, see Dix, Waiver 
in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 193 
(1977). 
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begs the question. Obviously, if the defendant were still satisfied 
with the decision he made at his arraignment, he would not be at-
tacking his conviction. The real question is why the defendant's 
wishes should be defined by his original decision, rather than by his 
present decision. What is the constitutional justification for prevent-
ing the defendant from changing his mind? Whatever the answer, 
it cannot be said that the state is merely giving effect to defendant's 
own wishes. 
To be sure, the state may always have an expectation interest 
in preserving a conviction against a defendant it believes to be guilty, 
and the fact that the defendant may have a complete defense to his 
conviction does little to derogate from that interest. But we have 
already seen that, absent a showing of actual prejudice, the state's 
mere expectation in the finality of a conviction is not sufficient by 
itself to justify the forfeiture of a complete constitutional defense. 78 
If this interest was insufficient in Blackledge to justify forfeiture, why 
should it be sufficient here to justify waiver? Is there any reason 
to believe the state lost anything less by the defendant's change of 
plea in Blackledge than it would by his change of mind here, or that 
the defendant gained anything more by changing his plea in Black-
ledge than he would by changing his mind here? If not, then, with 
one exception discussed below, a defendant who is constitutionally 
incapable of forfeiting a defense by pleading guilty must also be 
deemed incapable of waiving it. 79 
The one situation in which the state might be justified in holding 
a defendant to the waiver of a complete constitutional defense is 
where the state has relied to its detriment on the waiver. Suppose, 
for example, that we modify our hypothetical: the defendant is 
charged with two separate counts (Counts I & m arising out of 
separate criminal transactions. Although the defendant has a color-
able speedy-trial defense to Count I, he has no such defense to 
Count II. Moreover, instead of gratuitously waiving his speedy-trial 
defense (!ike the defendant in our prior hypothetical), the defend-
ant here enters into negotiations with the prosecutor. The prosecu-
78. See text at notes 45-49 supra. 
79. Admittedly, it can be argued that, although the state's mere expectation of 
finality ordinarily is not sufficient to override a defendant's interest in asserting con 
stitutional defenses, the state's interest becomes sufficient if the defendant weaken!! 
the moral force of his claim by making a conscious and deliberate decision to forgo 
his defenses. But see Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250, 266 (1972) (Marshall, J,, 
dissenting) (the state's mere expectation of the finality of a conviction is not suffi-
cient to override the defendant's constitutional right to go to trial, even where the 
defendant has made a conscious and deliberate decision to "waive" his right to go 
to trial). 
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tor agrees that the defendant has a good chance of prevailing on his 
speedy-trial defense to Count I; on the other hand, the defendant 
agrees that there is a strong probability that he will be convicted on 
Count II if he goes to trial. Accordingly, because of certain favor-
able sentencing provisions under Count I, the prosecutor and defend-
ant reach an agreement: the prosecutor agrees to dismiss Count II 
if the defendant agrees to waive his speedy-trial defense to Count 
I and plead guilty to Count I. The defendant accepts the offer and 
explicitly waives his defense in the course of pleading guilty to Count 
I. The question now is whether the defendant is still constitutionally 
entitled to disregard the waiver and challenge his conviction on 
speedy-trial grounds. 
The answer depends on whether the state now has a sufficient 
interest in the finality of the conviction to uphold the defendant's 
waiver of a complete defense. At first glance, the state's interest 
in finality here appears to be no greater than its interest in Black-
ledge: here, as in Blackledge, the defendant is asserting a defense to 
Count I that, if valid, would preclude the state from ever obtaining 
a valid conviction against him at trial. On the other hand, this case is 
significantly different from Blackledge, for in that case the state 
could not have detrimentally relied on the guilty plea, because when 
the conviction was set aside in Blackledge the state lost nothing more 
than it would have inevitably lost at trial. Here the state has given 
up something of value-an opportunity to convict the defendant on 
Count Il-in return for the defendant's waiver of his speedy-trial 
defense. 
To be sure, if the defendant were to breach his plea agreement 
by asserting his speedy-trial defense to Count I, the state presumably 
would then be free to prosecute the defendant on Count II. But, 
by that time, the state might no longer be able to prosecute the de-
fendant successfully. If the state relied on the defendant's waiver 
by allowing its criminal investigation and trial preparation on Count 
II to lapse, it would no longer be in as favorable a position as before 
the waiver to prove the defendant guilty at trial. Its prosecutorial 
position on Count II would have deteriorated because of its reason-
able assumption that it would never have to go to trial on that charge, 
and it would face the risk that Count I would be dismissed altogether 
because of the speedy-trial defense. Thus, in contrast to Black-
ledge, the state in our hypothetical case could lose the opportunity 
successfully to prosecute the defendant for either offense if he were 
allowed to assert his speedy-trial defense. 
Interestingly, this rationale for "waiver" begins to look very much 
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like the rationale for "forfeiture" in Tollett. In both our hypotheti-
cal case and Tollett, the defendant engaged in conduct that led the 
state to believe that it would never have to prove its case against 
him at trial; the defendant then raised a constitutional claim that, 
if accepted, would restore the state to the position of having to prove 
its case at trial. In both cases, the defendant's belated claim would 
put the state in a worse position with respect to its ability to prove 
him guilty at trial than if he had asserted his claim earlier. Accord-
ingly, the constitutional result should be the same in both cases: the 
state's interest in preserving its opportunity to prosecute the defend-
ant justifies foreclosing him from asserting his constitutional claim. 80 
If this analysis is correct, it leads us to some general conclusions 
about the nature of waiver. It means that the waiver of constitu-
tional defenses is not justified by a concept of free choice. If it were 
simply a matter of choice, then our first hypothetical defendant, who 
gratuitously waived his speedy-trial defense in the course of plead-
ing guilty, would be prohibited from challenging his conviction on 
speedy-trial grounds. Yet this analysis also indicates that waiver is 
justified in some cases; otherwise, our second hypothetical defend-
ant, who waived his speedy-trial defense to Count I in return for the 
dismissal of Count II, would be permitted to challenge his conviction 
on Count I on speedy-trial grounds. Ultimately, this analysis shows 
that the waiver of constitutional defenses, like the forfeiture of such 
defenses, is justified if, and only if, the state can prove that it has 
relied to its serious detriment on foreclosing the defendant from later 
asserting his constitutional defenses. 81 
Conversely, this analysis also permits us to draw some final 
conclusions about the nature of a forfeiture. We have assumed until 
now that there are certain constitutional defenses-such as in Black-
ledge-that a defendant is constitutionally incapable of forfeiting by 
pleading guilty. Yet we concluded in our last hypothetical that a 
80. It is tempting to argue that the defendant should be allowed to discover 
whether his defense would have been valid, and, if valid, to have his conviction 
set aside on the ground that the facts now show that the state did not rely to its 
detriment on the waiver. Unfortunately, there is a fallacy of time in the argument: 
the bargaining between the prosecutor and the defense was based on their then-mu-
tual ignorance about the validity of the defense; the prosecutor gave up what was 
perceived to be a chance to convict the defendant on Count II in return for what 
was perceived to be the defendant's chance to dismiss Count I. At that time, they 
both had an interest in being able to negotiate a mutual settlement of the disputed 
defense; consequently, if the defendant is now permitted to renege on his bargain 
and litigate the defense, he puts the prosecutor in the position of having given up 
something of value-what was once perceived to be a significant chance of convict-
ing the defendant on Count II-in return for nothing. 
81. See text at notes 45-50 supra. 
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defendant can waive such defenses to a charge if the waiver is part 
of a negotiated settlement of other outstanding charges. Hence the 
question: if a defendant can waive a complete defense as part of a 
negotiated settlement, why can he not also forfeit the defense by 
pleading guilty under the same circumstances? 
The answer should now be obvious: if a defendant can waive 
a complete defense to a charge by making it part of a negotiated 
settlement of other outstanding charges, he can also forfeit the com-
plete defense by pleading guilty to the charge as part of a negotiated 
settlement of other outstanding charges. 82 Indeed, the same princi-
ples control in each case. In the case of waiver, a defendant cannot 
lose the right to assert a defense unless he leads the prosecution to 
rely on his representation that he will not assert the defense. But 
if the prosecution detrimentally relies on the waiver, then the de-
fendant can be held to his decision, even if complete constitutional 
defenses are involved. Similarly, a defendant can forfeit the right to 
assert incomplete defenses by pleading guilty if his plea reasonably 
leads the state to rely on the fact that the case will never go to 
trial. By the same token, he can also forfeit complete defenses 
to a charge if, by his conduct, he leads the state to believe that it 
will not have to take him to trial on other outstanding charges.83 
The calculus is the same in each case. 
82. See Gaxiola v. United States, 481 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1973) (defendant can-
not challenge a guilty plea on the basis of a Blackledge-type defense if it appears 
that he pleaded guilty as part of a negotiated compromise with the prosecution involv-
ing other outstanding charges). So far we have discussed the defendant who pleads 
guilty to an offense to which he has a complete defense as part of a negotiated 
compromise of other charges to which he has no such defense. But the question 
of forfeiture can also arise in the opposite context: a defendant pleads guilty to 
a charge to which he has 110 def e11se as part of a negotiated compromise of other 
charges to which it later appears that he has a complete defense. The question 
then is whether he may challenge his plea to the former charge on the ground that 
it was induced by the threat of prosecution on other charges to which he now has 
a complete constitutional defense. In my judgment, the question should be answered 
in precisely the same way it was answered in the Brady trilogy: the defendant has 
no right to challenge a guilty plea on the ground that the plea was induced by ante-
cedent constitutional defects if, as a result of the challenge, the prosecutor now has 
to go to trial against the defendant on the charge to which he pleaded guilty. See 
United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976). But see Alschuler, supra 
note 2, at 21 n.68. 
83. The courts have adopted different standards to determine when, in pleading 
guilty to a charge, a defendant reasonably leads the prosecution to believe that the 
conviction will never be set aside and that the prosecutor, therefore, will never have 
to go to trial against him on other outstanding charges. Some courts require a show-
ing that, in pleading guilty to a certain charge, the defendant explicitly waived his 
complete defenses to that charge; others consider it sufficient to show that the plea 
to the charge was part of a negotiated settlement between the prosecution and the 
defendant of other outstanding charges. Compare United States ex rel. Ennis v. 
Fitzpatrick, 438 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1971) (defendant does not forfeit a complete 
defense to a charge by pleading guilty to the charge unless he explicitly waives the 
defense), with Ouillette v. United States, 435 F.2d 21, 25 (10th Cir. 1970) (defend• 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
According to conventional wisdom, a defendant in a criminal case 
can never lose the right to assert his constitutional defenses unless 
he "waives" them. Waiver, in tum, is justified on the theory that 
the state is merely effectuating a free and informed choice by the 
defendant himself. Accordingly, in order to show that a defendant 
has waived a constitutional defense, the state must prove that he 
made a deliberate and intelligent choice, entirely free of coercion, 
to forgo the defense. Anything less would be an outright "for-
feiture" lacking constitutional justification. 
It now appears that precisely the opposite is true. It is the prin-
ciple of forfeiture, rather than waiver, that ultimately explains the 
loss of defenses, because it provides a theoretical model for weighing 
the defendant's interest in asserting defenses against the state's inter-
est in foreclosing them. This forfeiture model explains which defen-
ses are or are not lost when a defendant pleads guilty, as well as 
which defenses are or are not lost when he fails to assert them in 
a timely fashion. 
Ultimately, this model also explains which defenses are (and are 
not) lost when a defendant goes through the ritual of "waiving" 
them. The ritual of waiver, by itself, is of no legal consequence. 
In the absence of prejudice to the state, a defendant loses nothing 
by engaging in the ritual and is as equally entitled to assert his rights 
afterwards as before. Hence, the conventional view of waiver:-that 
constitutional rights instantly vanish at the precise moment a defend-
ant declares his wish to relinquish them-is misconceived. The con-
trolling factor in the area of waiver is not the defendant's state of 
mind, but the effect his decision has on the interests of the state. 
Thus, the state cannot hold a defendant to a waiver unless it can 
represent in good faith that it relied to its detriment on his decision 
ant does forfeit a complete defense to a charge by pleading guilty to the charge 
if it appears that his guilty plea was based on a negotiated settlement of other out-
standing charges). Admittedly, whenever a defendant raises a complete defense to 
a charge to which he has pleaded guilty, the prosecutor may honestly be able to 
say that he would have charged the defendant with some other offense if he had 
known that this particular charge was vulnerable. But it is not enough that the 
prosecutor acted in unilateral reliance on the sanctity of the initial conviction; rather, 
by analogy to the Brady trilogy, the defendant must be shown to have reasonably 
caused the prosecution to rely on the integrity of the conviction. However, the prose-
cutor should be able to make such a showing without proving that the defendant 
explicitly waived his complete defense, by demonstrating that the parties engaged 
in a negotiated compromise of outstanding charges that led the prosecutor reasonably 
to believe that the defendant would never contest the charge to which he pleaded 
guilty. 
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or that it would suffer substantial prejudice if he were allowed to 
rescind. 
Waiver can thus be seen for what it really is-a doctrine that 
defines the outer limits of constitutional rights. Waiver is not some-
thing distinct from the particular rights it circumscribes. It is part 
and parcel of those constitutional rights, much in the same way that 
the doctrine of "fighting words" is part of the constitutional right of 
free speech. Both are doctrines of limitation that define areas in 
which the state's interests outweigh those of the individual. Accord-
ingly, as with other constitutional limitations, waiver must be justi-
fied: the state must come forward with a legitimate and persuasive 
reason for limiting a defendant's constitutional defenses-aside from 
the meretricious fact that he once made a decision not to assert them. 
In sum, waiver is part of the broader principle of forfeiture: here, 
as with forfeiture, the state must demonstrate that its interest in fore-
closing constitutional defenses outweighs the defendant's interests in 
asserting them. 
